Speeches and Transcripts
Challenges of Leadership in International Society: Halting the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Remarks by Ambassador Alexander Vershbow
to the KAIST Leadership Course
Daejeon, Korea
April 7, 2006
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| Alexander Vershbow at the KAIST |
Your invitation gave me my first opportunity to visit Daejeon, something I have been very much looking forward to. Since arriving this morning, I’ve had the opportunity to visit with Mayor Yum Hong-chul and Acting Governor Yoo Duk-joon. I visited the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), the Canadian-American Studies Institute at Chungnam National University, and an art gallery.
In between, I have learned why Daejeon is famous as a world-class center for scientific research. I am told that, in addition to KAIST, Daejeon is host to another 19 educational institutions. There are some 18 government research institutes, and more than two dozen others funded by private companies. Altogether, Daejeon is home to more than 18,000 researchers. That’s a lot of intellectual firepower!
Ties Between Daejeon and the United States
This is my first visit, but it has quickly become clear to me that the bonds between the research community in Daejeon and the United States are long-standing and very solid. Just last month, the U.S. National Institutes of Health and the Korea Research Institute of Chemical Technology launched here in Daejeon a jointly-sponsored research center to work on discovery of new tuberculosis drugs. We are excited about the potential for that research to help find new cures for infectious disease.
This jointly-sponsored TB project is just one example of the broad cooperation between our two governments. The United States views Korea as one of our primary partners in the world today, and we are confident that the relationship will continue to grow even stronger in the coming years. One exciting new way we hope to strengthen our ties is through a free trade agreement. Already, Korea is our seventh-largest trading partner. I suspect that the creative work done here in Daejeon has played an important role in fueling the rapid expansion of Korea’s trade.
The ties between Daejeon’s research community and my country go deep. I would venture to guess that a very large number of Daejeon’s 18,000 researchers either have Ph.D.’s from the United States, or were trained by someone who does. At KAERI this morning, I was reminded that 2006 marks the 50th anniversary of the Korea-U.S. Agreement on Cooperation in nuclear energy, and reminded as well of the important role that our bilateral collaboration has had in KAERI’s development. As it happens, 2006 is also the 40th anniversary of the founding, with substantial U.S. financial and technical support, of the Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST), the progenitor of KAIST and of several of the government research institutes now located in Daejeon.
I have before me some of the likely leaders of the next generation of Daejeon’s scientific and intellectual elite. I understand that the purpose of the Leadership Course is to expose this rising generation to issues that go beyond the bounds of science and technology. I strongly applaud that goal. With such a concentration of intellectual firepower, Daejeon’s research community should stand up and be heard, not only on issues of scientific importance, but on issues of national and international significance as well.
A Central Global Challenge: Addressing the Threat of Proliferation
Therefore, I want to talk to you about one of the most important challenges facing the global community today: the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The destructive power of such weapons is frightful. A single nuclear device could wipe out an entire city in an instant, and leave it so contaminated that it could not be rebuilt for many years.
This issue is not new. Since the dawn of the nuclear age, mankind has understood the grave threat to civilization posed by nuclear weapons. In the early 60’s, during the Cuban missile crisis, the world stood at the brink, looking over the edge of the abyss of full-scale nuclear war, and did not like what it saw. The 1950’s and early 60’s also saw British, French and Chinese nuclear tests. The prospect was for more nations eventually to follow suit. This was before the emergence of transnational terrorist groups itching to get their hands on weapons of mass destruction.
Centerpiece of Nonproliferation Efforts: the NPT
Rather than let events follow their course, the world decided that a future with many nations bristling with nuclear arms would be intolerable, and determined to take action. The result was the negotiation of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, usually called the NPT. Since it entered into force in 1970, some 188 countries have acceded to the NPT, making it the most widely accepted arms control agreement ever. Only Israel, India and Pakistan have remained outside it, and North Korea has withdrawn from it after having been found in violation.
The NPT is based on a fundamental premise. Non-nuclear states gave up the right to acquire nuclear weapons, and accepted IAEA safeguards to guard against diversion of nuclear material to prohibited purposes. While in compliance with these commitments, they retain the right of access to the benefits of civilian nuclear power. For their part, the nuclear states agreed to work toward nuclear disarmament. All parties to the Treaty agreed to good faith negotiations on general and complete disarmament.
As one of the five recognized nuclear powers, the United States has faithfully upheld its commitments. Nowhere is our commitment to cooperate in the legitimate pursuit of civilian nuclear energy more in evidence than here in Daejeon. American experts are frequent visitors to KAERI, constantly moving forward in a cooperative arrangement now five decades old. Over that time, South Korea has risen to become the world’s sixth largest producer of nuclear energy, generating clean and affordable energy to power Korea’s impressive industrial advance.
The United States has also upheld its obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament. Under the Moscow Treaty, bilaterally concluded with Russia in 2002, we agreed to reduce our operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by the year 2012 to between 1,700 and 2,200, roughly one-third the 2002 level. When this treaty is fully implemented, the United States will have reduced its strategic nuclear warheads by 80 percent compared to the 1990 level. We have also eliminated 90 percent of our non-strategic nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War, dismantling over 3000 such weapons in the early 1990’s. Critics may argue that there should be even faster progress, but such criticism ignores that it requires a great deal of time to remove and dismantle these weapons safely. Further, no one can deny that we have made significant advances in this area over the last fifteen years.
Challenges to the Integrity of the NPT
Given the sweeping nature of its ambition, the NPT has faced difficult challenges. South Africa, Brazil and Argentina had serious nuclear weapons ambitions and programs, but were eventually persuaded to relinquish those ambitions and enter the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, we faced the possibility that three newly-emerging states – Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan – could have nuclear weapons, but we worked successfully to have the weapons transferred back to Russia, where many were destroyed. We were not successful, however, in persuading Israel, India and Pakistan to sign on.
With its near-universal membership, the NPT has succeeded in creating a strong international norm barring the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, adherence to that obligation has not been universal, even among states signing the agreement. There is much evidence that Libya, Iraq, Iran and North Korea have flouted their NPT obligations in the pursuit of nuclear weapons.
Given the controversy generated by the failure of coalition forces to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq after the 2003 invasion, it is easy to forget that weapons inspectors following the first Gulf War found plenty of evidence that Saddam Hussein had clandestine programs to make and stockpile biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.
Reinforcing the NPT Safeguards Regime
Beginning in the early 1990s, the scope of Saddam’s clandestine nuclear program before the first Gulf War, as well as evidence first of North Korea’s, and later of Iran’s clandestine weapons programs, pointed up serious gaps in the safeguards system created by the NPT, and led to new efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. The United States has taken a leading role in these efforts.
The first step was the negotiation of the Additional Protocol. For the NPT members that voluntarily accept its obligations, the Additional Protocol gives the IAEA expanded access to more facilities and more information. It permits IAEA inspectors to inspect and verify so-called “undeclared activities,” not just those that a state has specifically designated as open to inspection. This gives the IAEA powerful new tools to ensure that nuclear materials are used for exclusively peaceful purposes.
A model Additional Protocol was adopted in 1997. Since then, 75 states have brought the Additional Protocol into force, including the Republic of Korea, which brought its Additional Protocol into force more than a year ago. Thirty-two countries, including the United States, have signed the Additional Protocol but not yet brought it into force. The United States Senate has given its advice and consent, and is considering implementing legislation so that we can complete the process of bringing the Protocol into force. An additional 7 countries are negotiating an Additional Protocol but have not yet formally signed, making a total of 114 nations so far that have shown a willingness to assume Additional Protocol obligations. President Bush has proposed that the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group restrict exports of nuclear materials such as reactor fuel only to those countries who adopt the Additional Protocol.
Cooperative Action to Enforce the Norm Against Proliferation
Although the international norm against nonproliferation is now well established, a lack of international enforcement mechanisms made it too easy for those engaged in the illicit trade of nuclear weapons-related goods and delivery systems. In May, 2003, President Bush consequently proposed the Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI. PSI is a broad partnership, now supported by more than 70 countries. Using their own laws and resources, these countries coordinate their actions to halt shipments of dangerous materials, equipment and technologies, to disrupt proliferation networks, and to hold accountable the front companies that support them. The aim of PSI is to coordinate the diplomatic, military, law enforcement and intelligence assets of the participants in the fight against proliferation.
The value of this kind of cooperation was most clearly seen in the case of Libya. Interdiction under PSI of a shipment to Libya of nuclear-related equipment from the A.Q. Khan network played an important role in leading Libya to voluntarily agree to eliminate its clandestine efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and longer-range missile programs. Libya has now signed and begun to implement the Additional Protocol. International cooperation in the areas of law enforcement and intelligence also led to the dismantling of the A.Q. Khan network, which was peddling sensitive nuclear weapons technologies far and wide.
In another step to strengthen international enforcement of the norm against proliferation, the United States proposed a United Nations Security Council resolution mandating that all UN members criminalize activities supporting proliferation, enforce effective export controls, and provide effective security for nuclear materials within their borders. Resolution 1540 passed in April, 2004.
Cooperative Threat Reduction in the Former Soviet Union
The A.Q. Khan network showed what damage can be done by rogue scientists with access to unsafeguarded or poorly protected nuclear technology. Going back to 1991, and the passage of the Nunn-Lugar Act, the United States has worked cooperatively with the states of the former Soviet Union to reduce the risk of diversion of technology and nuclear material from the former Soviet Union’s extensive nuclear establishment. This is a program that I know well from my service as Ambassador to Russia. Our bilateral efforts have been broadened to include many other partners since the launching of the Global Partnership Against the Threat of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction by the G8 in 2002. Currently the United States spends more than $1 billion annually on nonproliferation and weapons reduction assistance in the former Soviet states – including to promote safe storage of nuclear material, and the elimination or conversion of redundant military nuclear facilities, in the former Soviet states. We are proud that Korea stands with us in this effort and is contributing toward the elimination of a Russian plutonium production plant at Zheleznogorsk.
The Threat from North Korea…
Despite these many efforts, the threat of nuclear proliferation remains with us. Two of the most serious concerns revolve around North Korea, which – in violation of its obligations as a signatory to the NPT – claims to have developed nuclear weapons; and Iran, where there have been "many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement" as noted in the February 4 IAEA Board of Governors resolution.
As Koreans, you no doubt know better than I do the disturbing history of North Korea’s repeated failure to honor its obligations under the NPT, the North-South Denuclearization Agreement of 1992, and the Agreed Framework of 1994. In 2003, North Korea withdrew from the NPT. Last year, North Korea publicly admitted to possessing nuclear weapons.
North Korea seems to be persuaded that having nuclear weapons enhances its security, when in fact it only increases its international isolation and retards its modernization. President Bush has made clear that the U.S. has no intention to invade or attack North Korea, and South Korea’s peaceful intent is equally clear. But as President Bush and President Roh made clear in their Gyeongju meeting last November, a nuclear-armed North Korea cannot be tolerated.
I long for the day when North Korea will follow Daejeon’s example, building its future around innovation and intellectual firepower, rather than relying on firepower that is measured in kilotons or megatons. South Korea chose that peaceful path and has been richly rewarded. North Korea can still do so too. We look forward to a prompt resumption of the Six Party talks so that the promise of a better future for the North Korean people can begin to be realized.
…and from Iran
And then there is Iran. Since late 2002, the IAEA has been investigating evidence that Iran has, since the mid-1980’s, systematically carried out clandestine activities aimed at creating capabilities for uranium enrichment and plutonium separation. The IAEA concluded in 2003 that there was an extensive effort by Iran to conceal its activities and a failure to cooperate on the implementation of safeguards. There can be little doubt that there was concealment because the activities were aimed at the eventual development of nuclear weapons. Last September, the IAEA Board found Iran in noncompliance with its safeguards obligations, and in February, the IAEA voted to report Iran to the UN Security Council. On March 29, the UNSC issued a Presidential Statement, which demonstrates that the international community is united in its concerns about Iran’s nuclear program and its efforts to conceal its nuclear activities. The international community is calling on Iran to suspend all enrichment-related activities, fully cooperate with the IAEA’s investigations, and return to negotiations.
We are committed to working with our allies to prevent the Iranian regime from developing a nuclear weapon because such a prospect is deeply disturbing. Iran is the most active state sponsor of terrorism. Its president speaks aggressively about his desire to wipe Israel off the face of the earth, and the regime has a longstanding record of undermining the prospects for peace between Israel and the Palestinians by arming and funding groups that have carried out suicide bombings and other terrorist acts. A nuclear-armed Iran would further destabilize an already unstable Middle East.
Iran claims that its large investments in uranium enrichment and plutonium separation technology are to support civilian energy production. But Iran has some of the world’s largest reserves of oil and gas, and it does not have any functioning nuclear reactors for generating electricity. Russia has a contractual commitment to supply fuel for the one reactor currently under construction, for at least the first ten years of operation. Moreover, Iran does not have sufficient uranium reserves to support the nuclear power program it claims to be seeking. Iran’s claim that its fuel-cycle work is related to civilian energy needs is simply not credible.
Removing the Temptation of the Full Fuel Cycle
That Iran can, arguably, claim a “right” to build the capacity to enrich uranium and separate plutonium, despite the implications for weapons proliferation, points up another loophole in the NPT. To try to close this loophole, the United States has proposed that nuclear supplier nations refuse to sell uranium enrichment or reprocessing equipment or technology to any state that does not already possess full-scale, fully-functioning capabilities. In turn, the nuclear states would ensure that states renouncing enrichment and reprocessing have reliable access, at reasonable cost, to fuel for their civilian reactors.
By providing an incentive to states that choose not to engage in indigenous enrichment and reprocessing, this proposal would in no way hinder states interested in the truly peaceful benefits of nuclear energy, and it would take an important step toward thwarting the ambitions of those who would use peaceful nuclear energy programs as the cover for the pursuit of nuclear weapons.
The United States believes that nuclear energy should play a large role in meeting the growing worldwide demand for clean energy that does not contribute to the accumulation of greenhouse gases. At the same time, we want to ensure that the spread of nuclear energy does not contribute to the spread of sensitive technologies with weapons applications. In an effort to balance these two goals, U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman announced on February 6 the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP).
Under GNEP, the U.S. will seek to enlist nations with developed nuclear economies to partner with us in the development of advanced nuclear reactors and of fuel recycling technologies that will extend resources while minimizing the production of nuclear waste. Unlike current technologies for reprocessing spent reactor fuel, these advanced recycling technologies would not produce or burn plutonium, thereby reducing the risk of proliferation. The U.S. also seeks to develop a consortium of states already possessing the full fuel cycle to reliably supply nuclear fuel services -- both fresh fuel and the recovery of used fuel -- to user nations who forgo enrichment and reprocessing. Furthermore, it will pursue the demonstration of small-scale reactors that will meet the needs of less-developed countries.
We have begun to consult with potential partners, including South Korea, about these ideas. Korea and the United States already have under way a vigorous program of collaborative research on proliferation-resistant technologies that could reuse spent fuel in new types of reactors and reduce the total amount of nuclear waste.
Making India a Partner in Nonproliferation
Finally, I want to say a few words about another U.S. initiative, one that has generated a fair amount of comment internationally.
On March 2, President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh advanced an historic initiative that brings India further into the global nonproliferation mainstream. Under the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, India’s civilian nuclear energy program will become transparent for the first time. It will ensure that 65 percent of India’s civilian power reactors come under IAEA safeguards, a proportion that will rise further as new reactors are imported. Currently, only four of India’s reactors are safeguarded.
This effort is controversial because it opens the door to cooperation on civilian nuclear energy with India despite its refusal to give up its nuclear weapons and sign the NPT. But it is a practical, real world solution that seeks to overcome the gulf that has long separated India from the international community in civil nuclear affairs. The new cooperation is limited to the civil realm, and will not advance India’s existing military program. Any new civil reactors and associated facilities will be placed under rigorous IAEA safeguards to prevent diversion of technology and materials.
India is a democracy, a peaceful state with a solid nuclear export record that welcomes IAEA oversight for its civilian program. India’s commitments under this initiative are consistent with, and a net gain for, our ongoing efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation regime.
Conclusion
Most of you are too young to remember much about the Cold War. It was a time when we lived under the shadow of the threat of nuclear annihilation, when our survival depended on so-called “MAD” deterrence strategies threatening Mutual Assured Destruction. What made those calculations rational, and bearable, was the recognition that the other side also wanted to survive.
The emergence of Al Qaeda, a sophisticated network of extremists intent on inflicting mass casualties, motivated by a desire for “martyrdom” and completely unrestrained by the will to survive, adds a new urgency to our old preoccupation with nonproliferation. If it was dangerous to have nuclear weapons in the hands of relatively rational nation-states, it would be exponentially more so to have them in the hands of suicide bombers. The more widely the technology spreads, even among state actors, the greater the risk that it can be diverted, intentionally or not, to the undeterrable terrorists. We must stop that from happening.