Speeches and Transcripts
The Future of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia
Reflections by Alexander Vershbow,
U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea and
former U.S. Ambassador to Russia and NATO
Borton-Mosley Distinguished Lecture on Eurasia,
Columbia University
New York - April 26, 2007
Harriman Institute Director Catharine Nepomnyashchy, Weatherhead East Asian Institute Director Myron Cohen, I would like to thank you for inviting me to deliver this year’s Borton-Mosely lecture on Eurasia. I am truly honored to follow former Under Secretary of State and Ambassador to Japan Michael Armacost as the second speaker in this lecture series honoring Hugh Borton and Philip Mosely, as past directors of Columbia University’s East Asian and Russian Institutes. It is a particular honor for me to return to Morningside Heights, where I earned a Master’s Degree in International Affairs and Certificate of the Russian Institute in 1976, when Marshall Shulman was the Director and mentor for many aspiring diplomats and Sovietologists.
Today, I would like to focus our attention on Northeast Asia – which I’ll define as China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and North Korea. I also will include the United States in this group because of our alliances and vital interests in the region. I’ll share my perspectives as the American Ambassador in Seoul, where I have served for one-and-a-half years, and draw on my previous experiences in Moscow and NATO to bring in Eurasian perspectives. Much of what I plan to say reflects my own thinking, rather than established U.S. policy, since this is an area where official thinking is still at an embryonic stage. Recognizing the unofficial nature of my remarks, I hope nevertheless that my comments will prompt you to engage in the discussion session to follow.
In the State Department, we most often deal with the pressing issues of the day or week, trying to make sure that the President and Secretary of State have the information and ideas needed to manage the latest crisis or dispute. Today, however, I propose a different approach. I would like to ask that you join me in looking over the horizon – five to ten years down the road – at possible future scenarios for Northeast Asia. Let me put forward the following questions: Is it plausible to arrive at a Northeast Asia where nations focus on the region’s common interests and transnational challenges rather than on historical enmities and mutual suspicions? Can we imagine dynamic Northeast Asia as one seamless economy?
To consider these questions, I propose to divide my discussion into three parts: first, a look at the immediate problem the region is facing together – North Korea; then, stepping back and looking at the region as a whole and what cooperation is already developing; and finally looking at where I see U.S. interests in this equation.
Let me give you a flavor for what I have in mind for Northeast Asia with the following quote from an eminent South Korean, now a New Yorker, Secretary General of the United Nations Ban Ki Moon. In July 2006, when he was Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea, Ban Ki Moon wrote an article for the Harvard Review in which he said:
“....historians might characterize the Six-Party Talks as the Asian version of the embryonic stage of the CSCE [the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe]. The CSCE was the first meaningful venue in which European countries, each with different values and ideals, coalesced to discuss various issues of mutual interest... Now the time has come for the political leaders of Northeast Asia to gather their wisdom and present their shared strategic vision for the future.”
That’s an admirable vision statement. But before we get that far, let’s start with the immediate challenge in Northeast Asia – North Korea.
Part I – North Korea’s Choice
North Korea faces a strategic choice, and the decision North Korea makes means a lot for the future of Northeast Asia. North Korea’s choice is between denuclearization and further isolation.
– If it chooses denuclearization (and by that, I mean complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization), North Korea will be able to join the international community. It will receive energy, humanitarian and other economic assistance. The United States is prepared to normalize relations with the DPRK if it abandons its nuclear weapons and nuclear programs. The United States, the ROK and China will work with North Korea toward a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula to replace the 54-year-old Armistice, which was intended to be a temporary cease-fire arrangement. Japan will work toward normalization provided that its concerns, especially the abduction issue, are addressed, and has stated that it will provide substantial economic assistance.
– If North Korea chooses not to denuclearize, it is in effect choosing further isolation, in large part because the international community will continue to work together in strictly enforcing UN Security Council Resolutions 1695 and 1718, and perhaps impose even tighter sanctions. .
The Six-Party Talks – in which China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Russia, and the United States have been negotiating with North Korea since 2003 – have made important progress toward denuclearizing North Korea, showing the value of this multilateral approach. Under the February 13 Beijing agreement on “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” – referring to the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement – North Korea promised that it would “shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment, the Yongbyon nuclear facility.” That is the place where North Korea has produced plutonium for several nuclear weapons
This “Phase I” step is very important, but the Five Parties are even more interested in Phase II – disabling all of North Korea’s nuclear facilities and obtaining a complete declaration of the nuclear weapons and programs slated for elimination in accordance with the September 2005 Joint Statement. We hope to finish these Phase II steps before the end of this year. And these measures are only a way station toward the ultimate goal for the third and final phase, dismantlement by North Korea of all its nuclear weapons and facilities, fulfilling the DPRK’s September 2005 pledge that it was “...abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs...”
Much attention has been paid to the fact that the 60-day deadline for the initial actions passed without the completion of all actions because of technical complications relating to resolution of the Banco Delta Asia issue. While the DPRK has not yet formally invited the IAEA back, or begun to shut down the Yongbyon facility, we note positive statements issued by the DPRK on April 13 and again on April 20, reaffirming the North's commitment to the February 13 agreement and to inviting back IAEA inspectors.
As we have emphasized to the North, the Six-Party process and full implementation of the Initial Actions agreement and the September 2005 Joint Statement offers many benefits for the DPRK – in terms of normalized relations, and energy, economic and humanitarian assistance. But those benefits will only be provided if North Korea's delivers on its commitments. Full normalization can only take place when there is full denuclearization – it’s just that simple.
I can’t tell you how this is all going to come out. I can’t tell you with certainty that North Korea has made the strategic choice to denuclearize. But I can tell you that the Six-Party Talks have already produced one important result that bears on today’s discussion. With these talks, the countries of Northeast Asia, and the United States, a country with vital interests in the region, are working together in an unprecedented way.
The United States government greatly appreciates China’s leadership of the Six-Party Talks. We are also encouraged that China is underlining its interest in a denuclearized North Korea by chairing the “Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” working group that was established in February. Similarly, the Six-Party Talks have brought closer collaboration between the United States and South Korea with regard to North Korea. ROK leadership of the “Economy and Energy Cooperation” working group, which is organizing economic assistance to North Korea that is so vital for the North Korean people, is very important.
Also relevant to today’s discussion is that Russia is chairing the “Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism” working group, which is beginning – just beginning – to talk about confidence-building mechanisms and security arrangements for the region. This list of working groups may sound a bit bureaucratic, and it is; but this is how governments get serious about dealing with each other, so these first steps toward institutionalizing the Six-Party Talks are important.
But this all comes back to a choice for North Korea. As President Bush said after the DPRK’s nuclear weapon test last October:
“[North Korea’s nuclear activities] deprive the North Korean people of the increased prosperity and better relations with the world offered by the implementation of the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. The oppressed and impoverished people of North Korea deserve that brighter future.”
We focus a great deal of energy on the North Korean nuclear issue, for understandable reasons: a nuclear North Korea destabilizes the Korean Peninsula, could prompt other countries in the region to develop nuclear weapons, and presents global proliferation risks. Hence, eliminating North Korea’s nuclear weapons and programs will remain the central task in Northeast Asia until it is accomplished.
But as I said at the outset, I’d like to look beyond the current state-of-play in the Six-Party Talks. Let’s explore the economic possibilities that will emerge if North Korea chooses the path of full denuclearization. What then?
Former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld liked to show visitors a satellite photograph of the Korean Peninsula at night. It shows the blaze of light from South Korea and much of China, especially along the coast, but for North Korea there is essentially only a single, faint dot of light coming from Pyongyang. If North Korea denuclearizes, the lights could literally come on in North Korea. In the first instance, this would give North Korean citizens – now facing hunger and deprivation on a massive scale – many of the same development opportunities that much of Asia has already successfully taken advantage of. This alone is a good reason to push to make North Korea a responsible member of the international community.
Consider also what a normal North Korea would mean for South Korea. The South Korean engagement projects that are operating now – the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the Mt. Kumgang tourism project – would be just the beginning. South Korean firms would likely invest much more in the North if the DPRK gives up nuclear weapons and opts for normal ties with the rest of the world. Firms from China and other countries would also be very interested. Formal unification of the two Koreas may be much farther down the road, and will depend on political developments in both countries; but closer, mutually beneficial economic ties between the two Koreas would clearly become possible if the Six-Party Talks succeed.
Consider another possibility. In front of Seoul’s main train station there is a billboard touting a potential train journey from Pusan (at the southern end of South Korea) to Paris. Such a Eurasian link would become possible if North Korea were integrated into Northeast Asia. Politically, North Korea is a vestige of the Cold War; economically, North Korea is the key missing piece of the Northeast Asian jigsaw puzzle. The DPRK is now a threat to the region, but it could choose to become part of Northeast Asia’s wealth-building potential.
Part II – Northeast Asia as a Region
We’ve looked at North Korea – Northeast Asia’s central challenge. Now let’s step back and look at Northeast Asia as a region; at the possibilities for cooperation.
The terms “Northeast Asia” and “region” don’t immediately seem to go together. The region faces unresolved historical issues and different systems of government. On the other hand, Northeast Asia’s dynamism and growing economic significance are clear. China, Japan, and South Korea together account for almost one-quarter (23 percent) of the world’s population; 18 percent of world income; and 14 percent of world trade. Russia’s Far East, with its vast natural resources, adds to this regional significance. Consider the dynamism of the region. China’s exports – over $760 billion in 2005 – increased 186 percent since 2001. Over that same four-year period, South Korea’s exports increased 89 percent and Japan’s 47 percent. Nowhere else in the world has there been that kind of growth.
Within Northeast Asia, trade has expanded markedly also: South Korea’s trade with China reached $118 billion in 2006, a 24-fold increase over the $5 billion in two-way trade in 1992, shortly after official relations were established. Northeast Asia’s intra-regional trade expanded three times as fast as cross-Pacific trade from 1999 to 2003. China’s economy has grown, on average, at 10 percent per year for the past 15 years. The United States views Northeast Asia as important to our economic interests, as demonstrated by the Free Trade Agreement we just concluded with South Korea after 10 months of negotiations, which we expect will attract increased Chinese and other investment into South Korea, in addition to the increased trade and investment involving U.S. companies and service providers.
My point here is that the growing success of Northeast Asia’s economies has led to growing de facto economic interdependence. This could, in turn, serve as the foundation for more formal economic integration and for broader political cooperation and security dialogue. In addition, Russia’s increased economic cooperation with China, South Korea and Japan could help reverse the post-Soviet economic and demographic decline currently underway in the Russian Far East.
The de facto economic integration that is taking place is largely the result of individual business decisions, as companies seek the best sources and markets for their products. There is nothing wrong with that, and countries in the region – notably Japan – would benefit if they further lowered trade barriers.
In addition, though, I believe that political leaders in Northeast Asia should encourage and boost this enhanced regional cooperation. To give you one example, what if Northeast Asia got together to establish a technology research institute – perhaps with specialized units in each of the countries – to look at alternative fuels and renewable energy? The best scientists and engineers from the region could cooperate – let’s not forget that these are the same people who brought you plasma screen TVs and video cell phones. In addition, such an institute could be a Northeast Asian version of Japan’s Asia Pacific Energy Research Center, established in 1996 to look at energy issues for APEC countries. With it, Northeast Asian countries could talk about joint oil and gas projects and pipelines, linking energy-supplier Russia more closely to Northeast Asia’s huge energy markets.
As the State Department’s Robert Manning has written with regard to shared energy challenges in Asia: “Rather than being a source of conflict, energy has the capacity to become an integrative force, creating a larger sense of shared interests and stakes in cooperation.” Manning argues that Asia’s energy needs are so great that countries will be forced to work together. Possibilities include cross-border natural gas pipelines, electricity grid linkups, cooperative stockpiling, and cooperation in preventing maritime piracy.
I’m suggesting that Northeast Asian countries enhance economic integration – where shared interests in prosperity and efficiency are clear – as a means to build a platform for increased discussion of security issues. Increased people-to-people ties will help as well. I applaud the Japanese Government’s recent announcement that it will invite 1,000 students from Korea, as well as 5,000 other students from elsewhere in Asia, to study in Japan. All of the countries of Northeast Asia place tremendous emphasis on education – with parents in South Korea spending much of their disposable income on extra schooling for their children. What if the countries of Northeast Asia – and I hope the United States could also participate – were to establish a “Northeast Asia Scholars” program, inviting the best and brightest multilingual students to study at each other’s top universities? This would build on the “Future Leaders Forum: Japan-Korea-China” that the three countries have held each July since 2003. This idea also fits in with what Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso has called the need to build a “knowledge network” for Asia.
Other possibilities would be to focus on shared challenges, including environmental issues such as yellow dust from the Gobi Desert, infectious diseases, climate change, joint response to natural disasters. Since there is a residue of mistrust and suspicion among Northeast Asian countries, the idea would be to start small, but be future-oriented, and gradually build confidence.
In raising these possibilities for expanded Northeast Asia cooperation, I don’t want to give the impression that none of this has been thought of before. Indeed, regional leaders have been quite active. At a trilateral summit meeting in 2003, after holding such meetings since 1999, the leaders of China, Japan and South Korea agreed to “strengthen their across-the-board and future-oriented cooperation in a variety of areas, including economic relations and trade, investment, finance, transport, tourism, politics, security, culture, information and communication technology, science and technology and environmental protection.” Reporting on progress under this agreement in January of this year, leaders noted that networks of officials and academics from the three countries have made significant progress on the five priority areas: economy and trade, information, environmental protection, human resources and development and culture. These meetings don’t make headlines, but are important signs of increased cooperation (although the participation, in this case, is limited to three countries and does not include Russia or the U.S.).
These efforts to enhance Northeast Asia’s level of cooperation are taking place in the context of wider efforts to promote Asian regionalism. The most relevant of these for Northeast Asia is the ASEAN Regional Forum, established in 1994, that brings together 25 countries of the Asia-Pacific region including North Korea and the United States, as well as the European Union presidency. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) aims to promote constructive dialogue and cooperation on political and security issues, moving from confidence-building measures, to development of a preventive diplomacy mechanism, to determining approaches to a conflict. Its current efforts are focusing on non-traditional security areas such as non-proliferation, disaster relief and maritime security.
These efforts are worthwhile, but not specifically focused on Northeast Asia, which has its own set of security issues to deal with. Seeing the need for such a focus, the ROK in 1994 proposed a Northeast Asia Security Dialogue at an ARF senior officials’ meeting in Bangkok, but that suggestion failed to bear fruit because of lack of support from China and North Korea.
APEC will continue to be very important to U.S. relations with the Asia-Pacific region. President Bush has called APEC the premier regional economic institution in Asia, since APEC countries account for 21 of the 30 largest ports in the world and over 60% of global GDP. Therefore, APEC is likely to continue to be the one annual forum that sees U.S. participation at the highest levels.
Since its inception, APEC has been an important voice for free trade and investment, capacity-building assistance in areas ranging from anti-corruption to pandemic influenza, and community building. Since 2001 it has also played an important role in combating new trans-Pacific trade-related security threats. Hence, APEC will remain central. But like the ASEAN Regional Forum, APEC is not specifically working on Northeast Asia’s unique issues. Its large membership and geographic scope may make it inappropriate for Northeast Asia-specific cooperation – hence the need to think of new sub-regional mechanisms
Another existing grouping is ASEAN-Plus-Three, where the three, China, Japan and the ROK, frequently sit down together on the margins of the larger meetings. There are also helpful “Track II,” or non-governmental, efforts to address Northeast Asia Security issues: the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, a think-tank established in 1993; and the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue, which the State Department helped set up, also in 1993. The point is that the seeds of increased Northeast Asia cooperation have been planted – but leaders still need to decide how to cultivate and, ultimately, reap the benefits of these farsighted ideas.
While the obstacles to regional integration in Northeast Asia may be formidable, we need to remember how far Europe has come. As Nick Butler wrote in a 2003 article:
“If Rip van Winkle had fallen asleep 60 years ago and woken up today, he would find in the European space a most remarkable arrangement: A group of countries - which spent the first half of the last century fighting each other in a series of vicious and genocidal wars - have in the last 50 years combined their fortunes into an intricate web of economic and political cooperation.”
I would add that the United States has played the role of catalyst at different stages of the European integration process – from the days of the Marshall Plan, up to today’s era of NATO and EU enlargement – and we can play a similar role in Northeast Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific region.
In suggesting increased integration in Northeast Asia, I am only reinforcing what all of the regional leaders have already said:
– Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, in his 2003 inaugural address, said that “Northeast Asia, which used to be on the periphery of the modern world, is now emerging as a source of energy in the global economy.” The ROK sees increased dialogue with Northeast Asia as important in preparing for Korean unification, should political conditions permit.
– In a speech last year, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso spoke about the need for an East Asian community, saying, “it is critical that there be cooperation between Japan and both China and the Republic of Korea, and second, that it is crucial for Japan-China and Japan-Republic of Korea relationships to be firmly grounded in this broader view” of an East Asian community.
– During their November 2006 meeting, Chinese President Hu Jintao and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe agreed, as part of a joint statement, that their nations should make “joint efforts to promote peace, stability and development in Asia. Both sides should communicate and coordinate on safeguarding security in Northeast Asia, strengthening regional energy cooperation, advancing East Asia integration and other major topics to contribute to lasting peace, and common prosperity in Asia.”
– Russian President Vladimir Putin has also expressed the desire for increasing Russia’s outward engagement to “secure favorable external conditions for the development of Russia. ...We will work together with the United States, the European Union, and with individual countries of Europe. We will work together with our Asian partners, with China, India, and with countries of the Asia-Pacific region.”
Of course, it’s one thing to say you’re for more regional cooperation, and another to make such cooperation a reality. Nor can we simply wish away the historical tensions and significant mistrust that still exist in Northeast Asia. What I’m suggesting is that – especially in the wake of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, but even before that – Northeast Asia not only has reasons for increased future-oriented cooperation, potentially leading to the creation of new regional for a or institutions, but it has the means to do so as well.
Part III – U.S. Interests
Before I close, I would like to turn to how I see U.S. interests in Northeast Asia. We have been looking down the road at many possible changes in the region, but let me emphasize what will not change. The United States will continue to see our alliances in Northeast Asia, with Japan and the Republic of Korea, as the pillars of our Northeast Asia policy. These are countries with which we share basic values, especially those relating to democracy, human rights and market economics. Secretary Rice traveled to the region last November, after the North Korean nuclear weapon test, in part to reiterate the importance of those alliances, and John Negroponte made sure his first trip as Deputy Secretary of State was to Northeast Asia. By the way, we see the Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) – currently pending approval by both countries’ legislatures – as an important new pillar of our alliance with the ROK, in addition to a “win-win” deal for both countries in economic terms.
In our relations with Northeast Asia, we can’t ignore the values gap the we have with China and Russia. We seek human rights improvements in China; and we urge China to treat North Korean refugees in accord with China’s international obligations. As the U.S. “National Security Strategy” (2006) states, we want to encourage China to act as a responsible stakeholder that advances international security and stability. And we are concerned about Russia’s move from democracy to what many commentators have described as “soft authoritarianism.” This week’s commemorations of the late President Boris Yeltsin are a reminder of how the “values gap” with Russia has widened after the high hopes of the 1990s.
However, my experience in Russia and Korea has shown me that Northeast Asia has vast areas of common interest, which, if properly channeled, can substantially boost cooperation and free dialogue, providing solutions to what were previously seen as intractable problems.
And here I would like to come back to the Six-Party Talks, which, I believe, is an important part of this effort because, if successful, this regional forum has an opportunity to be so much more. As Secretary Rice said after the February 13 agreement was reached:
“It’s important to see the outcome in a proper context. It is a part of a broad and comprehensive effort not only to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, but also to advance a future of peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. Our approach has always recognized that we must address these two goals together and that is what we are doing.”
The key issue is still denuclearization of North Korea, but we are not only concerned with removing the threat that its nuclear weapons and programs pose to the region and the world. In addition, we see the potential for using the Six-Party Talks as the basis for regular security consultations, perhaps, leading to the emergence of a new forum. Such a forum could be part of our future-oriented regional policy, just as in Europe we have NATO, the OECD, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the European Union.
In closing, our foreign policy goals in Northeast Asia are quite ambitious. As in Europe, I believe our political and business leaders must together serve as the catalyst for bringing Northeast Asia together based on the vision of economic integration, people-to-people ties, rule of law, and above all, common approaches by governments to address shared challenges.
During the rest of my tenure in Seoul, I don’t think I will be able to get on a train in Pusan, South Korea and ride to Paris. But with foresight and perseverance, I believe we will all be able to do that sometime in the not too distant future.