Speeches and Transcripts 2008
Ambassador Vershbow
Press Questions and Answers
Seoul Foreign Correspondents Club
April 28, 2008
QUESTION: Regarding the recent revelations of Washington on the evidence of North Korean nuclear cooperation with Syria, (inaudible)…what does this mean for the outlook of the Six Nation Talks?
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: The fact that the Syrians were building an underground nuclear reactor with North Korean assistance has been an issue for some months and has already become a complicating factor for the Six Party Talks. The fact that we have briefed the Congress and the public on this doesn’t add to the gravity of the situation. It just rekindles the public focus on this issue. But I think that the way forward is the same it has been since we first raised it privately with the North Koreans several months ago. And that does bring us back to the need for a full accounting of their activities and their programs and -- perhaps now more urgently -- an adequate system of verification so that we can corroborate what they say in their declaration and also ensure that no further proliferation activities occur in the future.
We remain committed to addressing the North Korean nuclear issue and all its dimensions through the Six Party Framework. We had productive meetings in Pyongyang last week under the team headed by Sung Kim. The results of those talks are now being assessed in Washington, so I cannot speculate on what will be the next step. The situation is complicated but we still think we can find a way forward that gets us to the long-established goal of the full denuclearization of North Korea and the realization of the other aspects of the September 2005 joint statement.
QUESTION: Chris Hill said over and over again that the United States doesn’t want its partners to believe something that North Koreans pretend to declare. The North Koreans don’t make a clear response to this Syria (inaudible). Isn’t that exactly what’s going on, pretending?
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: I think that the important thing is that it will be critically important that the North Koreans live up to the pledge that they did make in the October 3rd agreement, which was to cease and desist from any further proliferation activity whether it is the technology or the know-how or the materials related to nuclear weapons. The fact that they were involved in a covert program with Syria just underscores the gravity of the proliferation risk and, as I said before, it puts even more weight on the requirement to achieve an effective verification regime so that we can be sure that their cooperation has stopped and that there’s no way they can restart it with Syria or any other third country. So there are going to be requirements for very strict verification and strict compliance, and this has always been a challenge. The public information now made available just adds to the urgency, but the task is the same it has been for several months, and we’re not going to compromise our standards in getting the necessary commitments and the verification measures from North Korea.
QUESTION: It seems the word verification has become this new mantra. I think you said it already at least 4 or 5 times today. Christopher Hill keeps saying it, Condoleezza Rice keeps saying it. What do you mean by that exactly? How do you verify what North Korea does in a country where you’re not going to be able to have IAEA inspectors who can jump on a helicopter and roam around and look around for nuclear programs and stuff that’s hidden under mountains?
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: Well, I’m not in a position to go into complex technical details about verification, and some of that is still being discussed both within our government and with the North Koreans. But clearly there’s going to have to be a certain level of transparency which may not have been something provided in the past by North Korea. For example, with respect to their plutonium production and plutonium program, they are going to have to provide a sufficient level of transparency and access so we can corroborate the figures that they are going to provide when they give their declaration to the Chinese chairman of the Six Party Talks, so that we can determine whether they’re providing us a full accounting of every gram of plutonium that they’ve made. There will have to be similar transparency on some of the other complex issues, such as the materials procured from other countries that raised suspicions about activities in the area of uranium enrichment. There are many different commitments by the different parties under the Six Party agreements that have been reached so far. I think that one of the tasks when the Six Parties eventually reconvene is to set up a long-term mechanism for the continued monitoring of the performance of all the parties vis-à-vis their commitments to one another. There’s a technical dimension to this and a political dimension to verification which is indeed something that’s become more urgent. You’ll probably hear me say the word “verification” many more times this afternoon.
QUESTION: What kind of penalties will the U.S. have if North Korea fails to deliver on its obligations? With regard to the timing of the resumption of food aid to North Korea, will there be a linkage with food aid or are they separate issues?
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: I don’t want to get too far into the game of speculating about what we might do if they fail to deliver. I think Secretary Rice has already spoken to this recently when she said that we’re prepared to halt or even reverse some of the steps that we may take in fulfillment of our obligations in the Six Party framework if we determine that the North Koreans have not lived up to their end of the bargain. On the broader question of food aid, we have traditionally taken the position that food is not a weapon. We have not been providing food aid for some time to North Korea because of our inability to reach agreement with the North on adequate measures for monitoring the distribution of food aid. That is a requirement set by American law, but it applies to any country to which we give aid; it’s not just related to North Korea. I think that would continue to be our approach to the specific issue of food aid.
QUESTION: I have two questions if I may. First question, the last time we spoke, there was some discussion about there being a separate mechanism for the uranium-based program. Chris Hill lately said that there could be a separate mechanism. Now we reached a stage where the Singapore agreement (inaudible). It’s unclear what form the North Korean declaration will take. What exactly is the U.S. government’s position on the North Korean declaration? Can it be something that’s under the table or does it have to be a full and open public declaration?
And the second question is that North Korea made a noise about being removed from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism and the Trading With the Enemy Act. At this stage of the Six Party talks, what is the U.S. government position on this? I mean, what hoops do they have to jump through? Thank you.
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: I’m going to take the second question first because that one’s a little simpler. Our position remains as it was in the February and October agreements, that we’re prepared to move on the delisting of North Korea from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list and the Trading With the Enemy Act when they have provided the complete and correct declaration that we’ve been waiting for since the end of last year and also the continuation of the disablement process at Yongbyon There’s been no fundamental change in the conditions involved for that, and hopefully, based on the work not only in Singapore but last week in Pyongyang, we may be getting closer to the point that we can carry out that commitment. But we’re not there yet.
I should add that – bringing you back to your favorite subject of verification – that even if we do reach a solution, the process of verification is going to be an ongoing process and that’s where Secretary Rice’s comment that I quoted earlier is still relevant. If we subsequently discover that North Korea has not fulfilled its commitments or is walking back on its commitments, then we reserve the right to halt or reverse the fulfillment of our commitments.
On your first question, I can’t really say much publicly about the discussions that took place in Singapore because it’s only one piece of a process of resolving the declaration issue that is still ongoing. But as we said before, it’s possible that different aspects could be addressed in separate documents. As Secretary Rice has said, not every single detail of diplomatic exchanges on these issues is necessarily going to be public, but certainly we’re not sweeping anything under the table or under the carpet, to use your phrase. We’re still trying to get to a satisfactory resolution of the uranium issue, as well as the plutonium issue.
MODERATOR: We’ll take this next question here. After that, I’m sure that there are other questions out there that are not related to nuclear or North Korea.
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: That’s a very good point.
QUESTION: I’m sorry if I have another question related to North Korea. I am curious about the timing of this White House briefing. I guess it was last Thursday. It seems to have come several days after the summit meeting. I’m wondering whether the concept of a full press briefing was discussed between the two Presidents and whether it was literally not held before then, in the month before then, while awaiting such a summit. There seems to be a different tone and some of the verbiage takes a harder line in the various press briefings that also came out of the summit.
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: I don’t think, as far as I know, that the timing of the briefing on the Syria program was related to the timing of the U.S.-Korean summit. We have been planning for some weeks to proceed with this public and Congressional briefing. We refrained from briefing on the details soon after the Israeli strike on the facility because of concerns about the risk of triggering an escalation in tension or even conflict between Syria and Israel. I think that the main factor was a continued demand from the Congress for more information. We have told the South Koreans and, indeed, we have even told the North Koreans many weeks earlier that, at some point, this information was going to be made public. So it was not something that came up suddenly in the course of the talks between Presidents Lee and Bush.
QUESTION: My first question is not related to the nuclear issue but unfortunately it is related to North Korea. It is about the decision to suspend the reduction of U.S. troops in South Korea from the present level of 28,500. What is the background of this decision? Is it because there is more tension or threat from the North than before?
The second question is: what is the possibility of ratification of the FTA in the U.S. Congress after the opening of beef imports?
AMBASSADORVERSHBOW: The decision to suspend further reductions in the U.S. troop levels was based on the principle that was involved in the original decision to draw down forces from our earlier level of 37,000, that we would continually review security conditions as the process unfolded. So the decision to suspend the reduction and maintain forces at roughly the level of 28,500 was based on a mutual assessment of current security conditions and requirements on the peninsula and in the region. An additional factor was that the relocation of U.S. forces, both from Yongsan and from bases to the north of the capital, has been delayed by several years. That was originally supposed to take place at the end of this year, 2008, but it has slipped to probably 2012. That has some implications for our ability to draw down certain forces, since there was an expectation that they would have been consolidated into a single hub that would produce some efficiencies – that is now 4 years behind schedule.
And let me add that, contrary to some speculation in the Korean press, this decision really is totally unrelated to the issues of cost sharing or the SMA negotiations. That’s the follow-on point.
I’m very glad you asked your second question about prospects for FTA ratification. First of all, our two presidents had a very good discussion of the KORUS FTA and its importance during the meeting at Camp David, and we were very pleased to hear that President Lee was committed to pushing ahead with ratification by the National Assembly, potentially during the ad-hoc session that has just begun, and if not then, in the early stage of the work of the 18th National Assembly after it takes office.
President Bush told President Lee that the KORUS FTA is a very high priority for his Administration, that he is totally committed to realizing his trade agenda before he leaves office, and he said that the entire Administration, not just the White House, but USTR, State Department, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture… all these Departments will be working quite tirelessly with the Congress to get the FTA enacted this year.
We’ve always understood that getting the votes for a huge trade agreement of this kind was not going to be easy. That’s especially true because it’s a presidential election year in the United States. But we are optimistic that now that the debate on KORUS has really started in the U.S., we’ll be able to demonstrate that it’s really a vital agreement for the United States, just as it is for Korea, and that we can, in the end, obtain the necessary votes to ratify the agreement.
I think that President Lee’s visit is certainly going to help us with this effort because he made a very good impression, not only on the Administration but on the Congress and the media and the business community. And in the course of his visit, I think he reminded everyone in Washington, and outside the beltway as well, about just how important the U.S.-Korea relationship is. And he also underscored his commitment to free trade and to creating a welcoming environment for foreign investment here in Korea.
And, of course, President Lee’s decision to open the beef market certainly is going to be a big help as well. I think that we’re very pleased that he implemented what was President Roh’s commitment, which was to reopen the Korean beef market and respect international standards. That does remove the major obstacle to FTA ratification in the United States. And, of course, it will also provide tremendous benefit to Korean consumers, who should never be forgotten.
Finally, I’m optimistic about the prospects for ratification, also because of the tremendous support that the KORUS FTA has generated from the U.S. business community, and that includes not just manufacturers, but agriculture and services as well. We have the biggest business coalition that has ever been assembled for a free trade agreement, and that is not surprising, given the enormous economic impact of the KORUS FTA on both of our economies.
QUESTION: I will ask a question that partly relates to South Korea and partly to North Korea, or both. Senator Brownback, a few days ago, put a hold on the appointment of your successor, citing her unclear answers or answers he was unsatisfied with regarding North Korea’s human rights problem. I wonder if you can just say a few words as to whether this will have any effect on the Embassy, or does it have any effect on you on your departure. And then, maybe theoretically, if you have any thoughts about what sort of difficulty or confusing signals that the U.S. sends out regarding North Korea.
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: I think it’s worth noting that Senator Brownback himself has highlighted Kathy Stephens’ very outstanding qualifications and her distinguished diplomatic career, so I think we’re all hopeful that this problem can be resolved fairly quickly. I think I probably shouldn’t speculate any further about the rest of your questions. We just hope that this is only a temporary delay and that her nomination will move forward.
QUESTION (translated from Korean): I have two questions. First of all, North Korea has wanted to have bilateral talks between North Korea and the United States since the 1950s. And it seems as though South Korea has been isolated from this process, so how long will you continue the bilateral talks between the U.S. and North Korea?
The second question is related to beef. Are you willing to launch efforts to answer, give clear answers to the South Koreans who are concerned about mad cow disease?
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: First of all, we will never countenance the isolation of South Korea in our engagement with North Korea. And even though we do pursue bilateral contacts, we are doing so within the framework of the Six Party Talks and on the basis of a common approach that we’ve worked out through close consultation with our partners, the first and foremost of which is the government of South Korea.
And the final judgment on whether we have obtained a complete and correct declaration is going to be made by all of the parties and not just by the United States. We had very good discussions at the summit level at Camp David on these issues. We have ongoing dialogue at ministerial and working levels. Kim Sook is, of course, in Washington starting from today to have consultations with Assistant Secretary Hill and other U.S. experts. So, whatever the North Koreans’ agenda may be -- and I don’t disagree with you that they are trying to bilateralize things as much as possible -- but that’s not our agenda. President Bush was quite forceful at Camp David in underscoring his belief that the Six Party process is the only way forward, and that he is not going to allow this process to be reduced to a bilateral issue between the United States and North Korea.
Regarding the safety of American beef, we certainly are open to discussions, and we hope, based on the agreement that we’ve just reached, that the discussion will be based on science, based on facts, rather than on politics or on emotions. I think that’s why it’s important for all countries who are involved in international trade, whether it’s in beef or other products, to rely on the expertise of the international organizations that set the standards and enforce those standards. And in the case of beef, it’s the World Animal Health Organization. That organization decided last May that the United States is now in the category of a “controlled risk” country for mad cow disease, and therefore, our beef is safe for consumption in the United States or in any other place. And we worked very hard to come up with an agreement that is consistent with the OIE standards, and I think that’s a very good example for other countries who have not yet decided to reopen their markets. It’s a very good example for them to follow.
QUESTION: The new government here has been talking about taking the U.S.-South alliance globally. Can you tell us what kind of things you expect South Korea to do in what countries, especially in Afghanistan? For example, as reported in the media, are you asking South Korea to send new troops to Afghanistan or asking for the South Koreans’ training of the Afghanistan police forces?
AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW: First, I would say that we are very pleased that the government of President Lee Myung-Bak has advocated upgrading our alliance into more of a global and strategic alliance -- which is, in part, a recognition of South Korea’s increasing capacity to contribute to the resolution of problems well beyond the Korean peninsula, whether they be security problems or new challenges like global warming or infectious diseases. So I think that we want to work together with the new government over the next few months to further shape what this means in practice. Where can our governments act more together than we have in the past to contribute to the resolution of global problems? This could include enhanced cooperation among our military forces, including possible continuation of the work that has taken place in recent years in Iraq and in UN peacekeeping operations. It could take the form of cooperation involving non-combat capabilities, and that’s where the potential for training of police in Afghanistan has come up in our discussions.
We’re not making any particular requests or demands. We recognize the sensitivities of some of these questions in the domestic debate, particularly after last summer’s tragic events with the hostages in Afghanistan. But I think that we’re going to be consulting on a full range of possibilities with the view, perhaps, to identifying some additional areas of cooperation by the time of the next summit in the summer. So this is very collegial process of consultation, and I think the focus is on advancing our mutual interests. This is not a question of South Korea doing things for the United States as a favor or as a contribution to the alliance, but as a way for both of us to address common challenges, common threats, as responsible members of the international community.