Speeches and Transcripts
U.S.-Korea Relations
Alexander Vershbow
U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea
Underwood Global Forum
Yonsei Underwood International College
May 23, 2007
Dean Lee, thank you for your warm introduction. It is always a pleasure for me to speak with Korea’s future leaders, and while I’ve been to Yonsei University several times, it’s very exciting to have my first opportunity to speak to the students of Underwood International College.
Let me start by congratulating Yonsei for creating a world-class program that emphasizes creative thinking, democratic ideals, and global leadership. You are clearly receiving some of the finest education available not just in Korea, but in the world. We granted scholarships to five of your peers to develop their leadership abilities in the United States through a six-week program at the University of Chicago’s Institute for the Study of Democracy, Leadership, and Service. Ku Dae-hye, Kim Hyung-joon, An Mi-jin, Hong Suh-yeon, and Yoon Yon-jong were selected through an intensely competitive process at the U.S. Embassy, which provided full financial support for the program. We’re pleased to help make Underwood International College a truly international program.
Just a month ago, I had the privilege of traveling across the United States with the Korean Ambassador to the U.S., Lee Tae-sik for our annual road show. In Chicago, Portland, Denver, Houston and New Orleans, we discussed key bilateral issues such as the Six-Party Talks, the FTA, the ROK-U.S. alliance, and the Visa Waiver Program with American civic leaders, businessmen and women, academics, and students. This was an excellent opportunity to provide current and accurate information to the American public about the Korean-American relationship.
These days, we are inundated by information. At times, we can even suffer from information overload. The Internet, 24-hour news networks, and pod-casting are all making communication even faster than before. Of course, this increase in information will require us to be better judges of the information made available. I believe one of the key traits for the success of your future careers will be the ability to discern useful information from this information deluge. I note that your Dean, Mo Jong-ryn, was able to display that skill in his recent paper analyzing the various Korean political factions’ attitudes toward North Korea.
American college students might describe the challenge in this way: That you must learn to keep your ears open to the “buzz” while weeding out the “hype.”
For those unfamiliar with American slang, you might ask what the terms “buzz” and “hype” refer to. These terms grew out of pop culture. When many people recognize and say that a certain song or movie is really good, that’s buzz. Buzz is based on fact, describing spontaneous mass approval. “Hype,” on the other hand, is when someone, say a marketer or politician, attempts to create an artificial perception to advance a specific agenda. To say that a rock band is “all hype” is to say that the band has been heavily marketed but doesn’t have the substance to justify the buildup. I am sure you can think of some Korean pop stars that are all hype, along with those that have generated real buzz!
I have been asked to speak to you about U.S.-Korea relations. I will discuss four current issues that affect the bilateral relationship: the Six-Party Talks, the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, our bilateral defense alliance, and the Visa Waiver Program. For each, I want to ask you, what’s the buzz and what’s the hype? What information is genuinely useful, and what information is being used to advance a specific agenda? Separating the “buzz” from the “hype” is a critical skill for everyone, including students of international relations.
SIX-PARTY TALKS
There’s a lot of hype about the agreements reached during what are known as the Six-Party Talks. Some suggest that the Six-Party agreements have already resolved all of the problems involving North Korea. On the other hand, others have derided these multilateral efforts not merely as a waste of time, but as appeasement of the North Korean regime. Both sides select those facts that bolster their point of view.
The truth is more complex and lies somewhere in between the two viewpoints. The fact is, in September 2005, North Korea committed to abandoning all of its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, not just to the United States but to its neighbors as well. In exchange, North Korea was promised economic and humanitarian assistance, an opportunity to improve and eventually normalize its relations with the United States, and the chance to negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula that would replace the “temporary” Armistice of 1953 and officially end the Korean War.
Just three months ago, we came to an even more specific timetable for North Korea to eliminate its nuclear weapons and programs. I have in mind the February 13 agreement on “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement,” in which North Korea agreed, as a first step, to shut down its Yongbyon nuclear facility under international monitoring in exchange for energy assistance and other steps by the other five parties. Both of these agreements created widespread hope: not only was North Korea’s denuclearization a possibility, but a path to permanent and lasting peace, and even reunification, could finally be seen on the horizon. These agreements demonstrated that a unified, multilateral effort could achieve progress and even consensus with the reclusive and isolated North Korea.
Yet merely reaching such agreements doesn’t solve the problem; all states have to implement their portions of the agreement. The February 13 agreement has experienced an unfortunate delay: North Korea was supposed to invite back the IAEA inspectors and shut down its Yongbyon facility within 60 days of signing the February 13 agreement, but has failed to do so, citing its inability to transfer funds to North Korea from its Banco Delta Asia account in Macao. While the United States resolved the BDA case in March and helped unblock all the North Korean accounts there more than six weeks ago, the North Koreans insisted on an electronic funds transfer. Unfortunately, the technical issues involved have proven more difficult than first imagined. I would say that North Korea’s difficulty in moving the funds is symptomatic of its tenuous relationship with the international financial community; it reflects the wariness of banks around the world in dealing with a country that has a history of using the international banking system to finance weapons proliferation, narcotics trafficking and other illicit activities.
The delay in implementing the February 13 agreement is disappointing, but it does not mean that the whole project should be written off as a failure. The agreement is still a viable basis on which to start the process of denuclearization, and we remain hopeful that North Korea will honor its commitment to shut down the Yongbyon nuclear facility as soon as the BDA issue is resolved, and that it will choose the path that leads to normalization and peace with the United States, South Korea and other nations. We take note of the fact that North Korea has continued to publicly affirm its obligations under the February 13 agreement and its intention to carry them through.
While the lack of progress is frustrating, this is the kind of situation in which patient, determined diplomacy is often most useful. Thomas Edison once said, “Success is 1% inspiration and 99% perspiration.” The gameplan for denuclearization has already been outlined; now we have to start moving the ball closer to the goal. While three months have passed since the February agreement, the opportunity still remains to make the Six Party agreements into a reality. All parties involved must now roll up their sleeves and get to work on implementing the agreement. The United States, for its part, is wholly committed to honoring its Six-Party obligations. Our cooperation with the ROK Government on this issue is valuable and essential.
After the February 13 agreement, significant buzz began to generate about using the Six-Party framework to address other regional issues. Many have argued that the Six-Party Talks could evolve into a permanent forum to address the other economic, political, and security issues in Northeast Asia – a region with few multilateral mechanisms or institutions. This is precisely the goal of one of the five working groups in the Six-Party Talks, the Northeast Asian Peace and Security Mechanism Working Group.
Considering the difficulties that the denuclearization negotiations have faced so far, you might think that getting the Six-Party framework to address other regional security issues will take some time – and that is true. I think regional leaders agree with the United States that the unprecedented level of cooperation and consultation we have achieved through the Six-Party Talks is something that we should build on and pursue with confidence and optimism.
At the same time, the United States supports inter-Korean engagement and reconciliation; and we agree with the Korean government that inter-Korean engagement and denuclearization of North Korea should go hand-in-hand. The denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is critical to the establishment of normal, peaceful relations between the two Koreas, to the improvement of economic conditions for the North Korean people, and to North Korea’s emergence as a responsible stakeholder in the East Asian sphere. By the same token, the Six Party Talks are about more than just denuclearization; they also aim to achieve normal political relations, economic development and integration of the North, and a permanent peace regime to end the Korean War.
In short, both inter-Korean cooperation and the Six Party Talks aim for a fundamental transformation of North Korea’s relations with the rest of the world. Therefore, it makes sense for South Korea, the United States and our other partners to use our limited sources of leverage in a coordinated way to maximize the chances for breakthroughs on both fronts. We still have a lot of serious work left to do, but make no mistake, this is a process that can move forward and bring great benefits to the people of North Korea, and to all of Northeast Asia.
KORUS FTA
Our Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, or KORUS FTA, is another topic where it’s very important to differentiate the buzz from the hype.
The KORUS FTA negotiations were launched last year, when the United States and Korea jointly decided to negotiate an agreement between our two countries that would remove virtually all of the trade and investment barriers between the United States and Korea. We started our negotiations last June, and we successfully concluded them on April 2 here in Seoul.
We reached a very strong and balanced agreement – this is the biggest FTA for the United States since we negotiated NAFTA with Canada and Mexico 15 years ago, and the biggest FTA ever for Korea. It will boost economic growth in both our countries and make the U.S. and Korea economic leaders in the Asia Pacific region. Tariffs on 94% of bilateral trade in manufactured goods will drop to zero within three years of the FTA’s implementation, in both countries. This will create more export opportunities for businesses in both countries – not just for big companies, but for small and medium-sized enterprises too -- and also create new choices and lower prices for consumers. The FTA will also create a more welcoming environment for foreign investment in a wide range of sectors, which will lead to more investment and job creation in both countries.
There’s been a lot of hype about the FTA over the past two years, and that’s likely to continue for the rest of 2007 as the agreement gets closer to ratification by the National Assembly here in Korea and the U.S. Congress in Washington. A lot of that hype reflects the views of people who are more interested in protecting their own individual interests or their own individual ideology, rather than the overall good of the nation. When faced with hype like this, the truth can be found by looking at the facts.
Some people claim that the FTA, and trade in general, will lead to economic difficulties. But all the economic studies that have looked at the FTA agree that it will create huge economic benefits for both sides. Here in Korea, the estimates are that the FTA will expand the economy by an additional six percent over the coming decade, lead to up to $3 billion in additional foreign investment each year, and create 340,000 new jobs – many of them for young people like you – over the next decade. There may be some temporary adjustments for some groups when they lose the special protection they have enjoyed over the years (which Korean citizens and consumers have paid for!), but the Korean Government has made clear it will implement measures to smooth this adjustment.
Some people here in Korea have claimed that since the U.S. is so much bigger than Korea, Korea will never be able to realize all the anticipated benefits from the FTA. But that’s an odd argument, because most people know that in economics and competitiveness, size doesn’t matter – sometimes the most competitive, prosperous economies are small, nimble economies like Singapore or Switzerland. Moreover, everyone knows that Korea for many years has had a significant trade surplus with the United States, and Korean companies like Hyundai, Samsung and LG have been very successful in challenging their U.S. competitors. In fact, most studies show that the long-term economic benefits from this FTA will be even greater for Korea than for the United States, since Korea has more protectionist barriers that it will be removing.
Recently, some people have been claiming that, since the United States has expressed an interest in clarifying our shared commitments to environmental protection and worker rights in the FTA, this means the U.S. wants to renegotiate the agreement and upset the balance in the text. But it’s important to look at the reality of this situation. Korea and the United States are already global leaders in environmental protection and worker rights. We want to work with Korea to clarify how the KORUS FTA, which already has chapters devoted to labor and the environment, will protect worker rights and the environment – and do so in a way that applies equally to the U.S. and Korea, so it preserves the balance in the agreement we reached.
This isn’t about renegotiating our agreement; it’s about strengthening the commitments we have already made so that the FTA can win support from the U.S. Congress, where the new Democratic majority feels strongly about the environment and workers’ rights. I think there are many Koreans who feel just as strongly about maintaining the highest labor and environmental standards in the global marketplace.
So I think when you look at the facts, you can see that a lot of the negative hype about the KORUS FTA isn’t really accurate. And if you want more proof, listen to the buzz. Most of the Korean public opinion polls taken after the completion of FTA negotiations show over 60 percent support for the FTA, compared to only 30 percent opposition – a very impressive two-to-one majority in favor. President Roh’s approval ratings jumped 10-20% after the conclusion of this agreement. This is buzz in its purest form: Korean citizens have seen how the agreement can tangibly improve their lives, and the lives of future generations of Koreans. American citizens haven’t been following the process quite as closely as Koreans, but in the United States too, a buzz is beginning to build around the KORUS FTA among the many industries and communities that will benefit from its implementation.
And the KORUS buzz isn’t limited to Korea or the United States. Immediately after the announcement of the KORUS FTA, Korea’s neighbors and major trading partners started to express some concern that they might be left behind economically by our FTA. They are now responding by showing interest in free trade negotiations with both the United States and Korea. If the KORUS FTA were economically damaging, or one-sided, why would Korea’s neighbors all be starting to consider similar agreements? The KORUS FTA has catalyzed the movement towards greater free trade in East Asia, and given both the United States and Korea stronger hands to play in the economic sphere
Very soon, the text of the KORUS FTA will be released to the public, in both countries. Korean as well as American citizens will then have the opportunity to examine the agreement, and let their voices be heard, both in support of and against the FTA. That range of views is not only normal, it is a strong indicator of the health of our democracies; and that public participation will give the FTA extra legitimacy when it is ratified. I am convinced the agreement will ultimately be ratified, in both countries, because I believe when people look beyond the hype, they see that the KORUS FTA is a truly win-win agreement that will bring great economic benefits to people of Korea and the United States. It will also strengthen our bilateral alliance that has helped keep peace in the region for over 50 years.
ROK-U.S ALLIANCEWhen it comes to hype, I think that our security alliance is often a newspaper editor’s dream come true. Just the other day, there was a Korean newspaper article that cited a think-tank paper predicting the “end of the alliance in ten years.” How do they know that? They don’t. Doomsayers generate provocative headlines and attract readership. It’s unfortunate that the hype generated by different political agendas distracts us from the facts of the situation.
There was hype when agreement was reached to reduce USFK troop levels on the Peninsula from 37,000 to 25,000 troops. Largely unreported was the fact that the United States also agreed to spend 11 billion dollars to upgrade U.S. military capabilities in the region through advanced technology.
There was hype when USFK began consolidating its presence in Korea through base relocations. What you seldom read about is that to date, 36 installations with a value of over $500 million have been closed and that 30 of those have been returned to the Korean government and the Korean people. Along with these camps, and in accordance with our Status of Forces Agreement, we have transferred to the ROK – free of charge – the full range of buildings, capital assets, and improvements found on these camps.
More careful analysis of the ROK-U.S. defense relationship will show even the casual observer that the alliance has been undergoing significant and positive change over the last 3-4 years and I think it’s easy to hear the buzz. Today’s ROK-U.S. alliance is a modern partnership between equal and developed nations that is being engineered to make it a more balanced relationship, with a global dimension, while still fulfilling its original mission of preserving peace on the Korean Peninsula. The United States has reaffirmed its commitment to maintaining a strong military presence in Korea, not only to prevent war with North Korea, but also to maintain stability in Northeast Asia.
With these goals in mind, in February Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Defense Minister Kim Jang-soo reached agreement on transitioning wartime operational control to the ROK military by April 2012. Just six months ago that issue was generating tremendous hype as opponents breathlessly predicted dire consequences. The truth is that the alliance has evolved to the point where it can safely and effectively carry out this transition with no reduction whatsoever in its deterrent capability. OPCON transition simply recognizes the ROK’s growing defense capabilities and the need for a more balanced sharing of responsibility. American and Korean security experts together decided that the timing of this transition makes sense, and it will be done in a way that maintains stability on the peninsula. Furthermore, the United States remains as fully committed as ever to the Mutual Defense Treaty.
When it comes to the alliance, I think that people are beginning to filter out the hype and are beginning to pick up on the buzz. We have a strong Korean military with the latest technology working hand-in-hand with a committed American ally to defend this country. Doing so with a smaller USFK footprint in Korea, and with every effort to be a better neighbor to the civilian community is not something to criticize. It is the right thing to do. That is why, despite all the hype we have heard about alliance issues over the years, something like 80% of the Korean people have consistently told pollsters that they support continuation of the U.S.-ROK alliance. I think that’s as good as buzz gets.
VISA WAIVER PROGRAM
I spoke earlier about the FTA’s role in integrating our economies further. This will be enhanced by increasing the ease of travel between our two countries. While this currently means visas, we are working with your government to make the Visa Waiver Program a reality. This program will allow Koreans to travel to the U.S. for short-term tourism and business without a visa. The possibility of Korea’s inclusion into the program has generated intense buzz, but also a fair amount of hype in the Korean media.
Contrary to what is often reported, there is no set timetable for the implementation of the Visa Waiver Program. The U.S. Congress is currently debating legislation that could introduce more flexibility in admitting additional countries to the Program. Right now, we can’t predict when the legislation will pass or what changes it will entail. In the meantime, Korea needs to begin producing e-passports, which include electronic chips containing the passport bearer’s identity information – which is one of the key requirements for the VWP. I do remain confident that Korea’s inclusion is on the horizon, and I’m firmly committed to making it a reality.
While the Visa Waiver Program is being hammered out, you will find that our visa operation here continues to be one of the best in the world. We processed more than 450,000 visas last year, and this year we could top the 500,000 mark. We believe that the best advertisement for America is America, and we want Koreans to visit.
We would especially like to see students of your caliber visit the U.S. Whether you visit via Embassy-sponsored programs such as the International Visitor Leadership Program, or whether you choose to strike out on your own path, I urge you to consider building bridges on the other side of the Pacific. I find it incredible that Korea sends more students to study abroad in the U.S. than any other country, including much larger ones such as China and India. These cultural and educational exchanges strengthen the bonds between our two countries. They create the buzz that helps to dispel the hype.
CONCLUSION
I hope that you have seen that what applies to pop culture also applies to policy. Separating the buzz from the hype will prove even more critical of a skill in the future.
What is the hype about the U.S.-Korean bilateral relationship? Some have labeled it as strained, or have suggested that that the two countries are drifting apart. I hope that you will see past the hype to the powerful reality of today’s relationship: we are growing closer together, not further apart. We are pursuing security through the Six Party Talks, through the modernization of our defense alliance, by forging win-win trade agreements that are making other nations take notice, and by working to build cultural bridges through the Visa Waiver Program. As a result, Korea is now poised on the forefront, at the cutting edge of transforming the traditional power dynamics of the entire Asian continent. Our alliance is evolving for the better, and I hope that when the day comes when one of you holds the reins of the bilateral relationship, you too will look past the hype and see why there is so much good buzz. I have heard great buzz about your school and program, and I anticipate that you will do great things in the decades to come.
I now look forward to answering your questions for the next half hour.