Speeches and Transcripts
Prospects for U.S.-North Korea Normalization and
a Peace Regime in Northeast Asia
Alexander Vershbow
U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea
Remarks to Ground of Reconciliation & Coexistence
Hwagyesa Temple, Seoul
July 11, 2007
Chairman Lee Bu-young, former Deputy Unification Minister Kim Hyung-ki, former Minister of Information and Communication Bae Soon-hoon, former Environment Minister and National Assemblyman Yoon Yeo-joon, and former Environment Minister Son Sook, thank you very much for your invitation to address the Ground of Reconciliation and Coexistence. It is a pleasure to have an exchange with such a diverse group of opinion leaders; it is not every day that I get to talk about the prospect of U.S.-North Korean normalization with an actress, a poet, and a Buddhist priest! In this regard, I’d like to extend special thanks to the Venerable Su-gyeong for welcoming us to your home. As my wife Lisa and I have deep respect and affection for Korean traditional architecture, visiting Hwagyesa is a refreshing and peaceful change of scenery.
Originally, I was supposed to speak to your organization on June 15 to celebrate the seventh anniversary of the 2000 inter-Korean summit. I had to postpone the speech until today because Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill was visiting Seoul at the time, just before his visit to Pyongyang. His visit to Pyongyang was meant to signal how serious the United States is – in partnership with South Korea and our other Six-Party partners – about resolving the nuclear issue in North Korea. I would like to thank you for your flexibility in rescheduling this invitation so that I can have tonight’s discussion with you.
Two weeks ago, on June 25, we commemorated the 57th anniversary of the beginning of the Korean War, the date when North Korean forces launched their aggressive attack on the Republic of Korea. This is always a somber occasion. So many lives were lost. Families were divided and of course the nation was divided. The Korean War commemoration is also an occasion to reflect the beginning of our alliance and to look ahead to what is in store for the two allies. And as we do this, we will realize that we have a deep and enduring relationship. We have overcome many challenges together and this alliance is healthier because of those challenges. Together we have built one of the most successful alliances of the modern era, built on a foundation of common interests and a commitment to the shared values of freedom and democracy.
I am very optimistic about the continued value and importance of our alliance for both nations. A key reason for my optimism is the way our alliance has evolved to reflect the changing realities of our countries and the global environment.
For example, less than two weeks ago, the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) was signed in Washington. If we can get past the next hurdle of FTA ratification by both the National Assembly and the U.S. Congress, this will add a new dimension to our alliance – boosting trade and investment in both directions, increasing jobs and economic growth, and making our two countries more competitive in the region and beyond. The strong public support for the FTA by the Korean people is a good harbinger for the continued strengthening of relations between our countries.
Another positive trend can be seen in the rapid growth of people-to-people ties between our two countries, as evidenced by the fact that our Embassy is on track to issue half a million visas to Korean citizens this year. When you consider that most tourist visas last ten years, it is quite mind-boggling that there is such a demand among South Koreans to visit the United States. Of course, we welcome these visits, and President Bush has confirmed that we are working hard with the U.S. Congress to include South Korea in the Visa Waiver Program.
Denuclearization Process
Among political issues, I would rate very highly our two governments’ partnership in working toward denuclearizing North Korea. Of course, this has been a challenge for both Seoul and Washington for a number of years – even decades. However, I am very encouraged by the recent developments, because they could signal truly meaningful changes for our relationship with North Korea.
Let me briefly summarize some of those developments from the last few weeks:
First of all, when the DPRK’s funds at Banco Delta Asia (or BDA) in Macao were successfully and legally transferred to a Russian bank, the path toward implementing the February 13 “Initial Actions” agreement was unblocked after more than two months’ delay. Our two governments consulted very closely throughout the process. I also believe that successfully concluding this BDA episode showed our patience and, more importantly, our commitment to a diplomatic solution to the North Korean nuclear issue.
Progress on BDA apparently prompted the DPRK to invite Assistant Secretary Hill to Pyongyang on June 21, the first visit by an American high-ranking diplomatic official in nearly five years. During that trip, North Korean officials conveyed their unambiguous commitment to implementing the February 13 agreement and the September 2005 Joint Statement.
North Korea also invited officials from the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, to go to Yongbyon for the first time in five years. Upon returning from the North on July 1, the head of the IAEA delegation, Olli Heinonen, described his trip as “fruitful” and said, “We have moved to an understanding on how to verify and monitor the Yongbyon facility when it is shut down.” The result of the visit was approved by the IAEA special commission just two days ago in Vienna, paving the way for another IAEA team to visit North Korea in the coming days to monitor the shutting down and sealing of Yongbyon – the first major step required of North Korea under the February 13 agreement.
The Five Parties have also been busy. South Korea has announced that it will soon fulfill its commitment to provide the first delivery of heavy fuel oil, or HFO, to North Korea – 50,000 tons in all – in tandem with the shutdown of Yongbyon. The first part of the delivery is due to arrive very soon; the remainder of this initial 50,000 tons of HFO is scheduled for delivery in August.
Finally, we now expect the next round of the Six-Party Talks to take place very soon in Beijing – probably July 18-19 – to set the stage for the next steps in the denuclearization process, as envisaged under the September 2005 Joint Statement and the February 13 agreement.
So, I believe we are about to see the completion of the so-called “initial phase” of the agreement all six parties made in Beijing on February 13. North Korea will most likely take the important first step of shutting down and sealing Yongbyon. This is important for both political and physical reasons. Politically, Yongbyon shutdown – especially if it is quickly followed by credible disablement – will show that the DPRK takes its September 2005 and February 2007 commitments seriously. Physically, the shutdown of Yongbyon means that the DPRK will no longer be producing about 750 grams of plutonium per month.
Still, this is only the first step in the process, and we have a long road ahead. The next phase of the February 13 agreement requires from North Korea a complete declaration of all nuclear programs and weapons that are eventually to be abandoned under the September 2005 Joint Statement, and the irreversible disablement of all its existing nuclear facilities. With these steps comes the benefit of an additional 950,000 tons of heavy fuel oil or its equivalent in other forms of assistance.
More significantly, as North Korea moves down the path toward the final goal of denuclearization, it can look forward to a fundamentally different relationship with the outside world. The United States, for one, is committed to begin the process of establishing full diplomatic relations with North Korea. Recently, President Bush had this to say about our commitment to the Six-Party Talks:
“If North Korea chooses a peaceful path, America and our partners in the Six-Party Talks are prepared to provide security assurances, economic assistance and other benefits to the North Korean people. Ultimately, the success of these talks depends on the regime in North Korea. Pyongyang must show it is serious by taking concrete steps to implement its agreement to give up its nuclear weapons and weapons programs.”
Let me underscore this point: The United States is committed to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and we are committed to using diplomacy to get there. With a denuclearized North Korea we can do many things, or as Assistant Secretary Hill puts it “everything is possible.” Beyond establishing normal political relations, we would be prepared to help Pyongyang to reform and develop its economy and thereby improve the lives of the long-suffering North Korean people. We are prepared for academic, cultural and scientific exchanges that can help North Korean society overcome the isolation and mistrust that have built up over generations. But denuclearization is the key. We aren’t prepared to settle for a partial solution that leaves North Korea with even a small number of nuclear weapons: complete normalization of relations and closer ties can only come with the complete abandonment of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and programs.
Prospects for a Peace Regime and Peace Mechanism
As I’ve said, we are still at the beginning of the process, and we should not get ahead of ourselves, because the work on denuclearization remains difficult and depends primarily on internal DPRK decisions. Even so, it is helpful to outline our view of what is possible for the Korean Peninsula and for Northeast Asia if North Korea denuclearizes.
We see prospects for fundamental, peaceful change that could both transform the Korean Peninsula and open up the possibility for a more secure and prosperous Northeast Asian region. On the Korean Peninsula, the goal that is potentially within our grasp is a peace regime. A peace regime is a package: it would include a formal end to the Korean War after 57 years and establish normal international borders between the two Koreas; it would include steps to implement the 1992 Basic Agreement between South and North Korea; and it would include confidence-building measures to enhance transparency about military forces and, perhaps, to regulate the deployment of troops and equipment in the border area. A peace regime is an act of statesmanship that will require mutual trust between the directly concerned parties – the two Koreas, the United States, and China – and strong support from the South Korean people. Negotiating a peace regime will be a complicated undertaking and take some time; but we are prepared to begin the negotiations at some point later this year.
Second, and related, is a potential peace and security mechanism for Northeast Asia. The United States sees enormous potential in the Six-Party Talks model continuing to be used as a forum for discussing and working toward resolving thorny security issues among the countries of Northeast Asia together with the United States, which has enduring security commitments and long-term economic interests in the region.
As you may know, the February 13 agreement included establishment of a Northeast Asia Peace and Security Working Group under the chairmanship of the Russian Federation. The Working Group has only held one meeting so far and there is general agreement that it needs to proceed cautiously. But I encourage you to think about the potential for such a group to gradually break down barriers and build trust within this region, perhaps starting with tasks such as joint search-and-rescue operations, doing something about environmental protection, or even building cooperative arrangements for energy supply and use. We can’t be naive and expect such a body to immediately overcome deep historical tensions, but we can envision it proceeding step-by-step to begin establishing a sense of community in Northeast Asia – similar to the role played by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe following the Helsinki accords of 1975.
I sincerely believe that North Korea and the North Korean people stand to gain the most from these developments: denuclearization, the peace regime, and normalization of its relations with the outside world. These developments would end North Korea’s isolation and ensure that it joins the phenomenal economic growth sweeping the rest of East Asia.
Just as we can be encouraged by the developments in the Six-Party Talks, we have also seen encouraging signs in North-South dialogue, such as the test-runs of the inter-Korean railroads last May – the first time the trains crossed the borders in 57 years. The two Koreas agreed to restart the railroad during the 2000 Summit, and construction was completed by 2003. But it was not until 2007 that the North finally signed a safeguard agreement that allowed the successful test runs in May.
We hope the recent test does not prove to be a one-time event, and that regular rail connections can be established to permit the citizens of North and South Korea to travel and get to know one another. Once the two railroads are completely reconnected and operational, goods produced at the Kaesong Industrial Complex can be transported at three-quarters of the current cost and up to two days faster. According to a 2005 report by the Blue House’s Committee on Northeast Asia, linking the inter-Korean railroads with Russia will bring $150 million to North Korea annually – not to mention $100 million to the South and $300 million to Russia.
And if the inter-Korean railroads are eventually connected to the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Trans-China Railway, companies will save millions of dollars when shipping goods between Asia and Europe – and someone in Busan will be able to take a train all the way to Paris, just as it is shown on the billboard next to Seoul Station.
I can’t help but be struck by the symbolism of the long-hoped for “Iron Silk Road.” North Korea is literally the missing link in this dream, the last piece in a jigsaw puzzle that will not only connect a vast portion of the world, but bring economic prosperity, potential, and the possibility of more openness to the modern day “hermit kingdom” that is North Korea.
Conclusion
As with the Iron Silk Road, improved inter-Korean relations, the normalization of U.S.-DPRK ties and a Northeast Asian regional security architecture all depend upon North Korea and its seriousness about denuclearization. A peace regime and full diplomatic relations with the United States are only possible upon the complete and verifiable elimination of all the nuclear weapons and programs in the DPRK. The United States has demonstrated its commitment to the denuclearization process and is anxious to begin making progress on broader regional goals. I also know that South Korea is one with us in sharing these goals – indeed, the close cooperation between Seoul and Washington has been key to the progress we have made so far. I very much hope that North Korean leaders make the decision which will lead their people toward a much better future.
Thank you, and I look forward to your comments and questions.