Ambassador Speeches

Ambassador Christopher R. Hill "Changes in U.S.-ROK Relations" Speech to the Kwanhun Club and Q&A Session Following

Korea Press Center, Seoul, Republic of Korea
October 7, 2004

Thank you very much, President Nam, for that very warm introduction. Thank you all for coming here so very early in the morning.

It's a great pleasure to be here indeed. The last time I was in this building, I must confess, was a long time ago, but I remember it very well because it was in June 1987 and I had lunch, I believe, in a restaurant on the 20th floor overlooking Sejong-ro. After lunch, we realized that we could not leave the building because there was a very large demonstration going on. So, I spent the rest of the afternoon, until about 5:00 or 6:00, watching the demonstration from the 20th floor window. It was, indeed, a moment that I shall always remember. Indeed, the entire movement in 1987 is something that I will always remember and in a way something that has helped inspire me not only in my affection for Korea but also in my other work in other parts of the world.

I come back to Korea with the realization that it's a very different country from the one I left in 1988, actually just before the Olympics. I come back with an understanding that a lot has changed and that, in order to understand what is going on in Korea, I'm going to have to meet a lot of different people and do a lot of listening with a lot of different people, because it is fair to say in Korea there is absolutely a sense of pluralism and a sense that everyone has their own opinion about many different things.

I'm new in my position. I arrived just eight weeks ago today, on Thursday, August 12. I'm continuing to go around to try to understand the situation, the new situation really, in Korea. I come here though with a real sense of optimism about what can be accomplished, an optimism for what Korea has accomplished and what Korea will accomplish. I come here with a real sense of optimism about our relationship and the belief that 50 years of the U.S.-Korean alliance is 50 years that have formed a very strong foundation for the next 50 years. I think that there is a lot we can accomplish.

The U.S. relationship with Korea is very multifaceted. It goes into many areas. I would say that it will exist far longer than the problem, the very difficult problem, we face today with respect to North Korea. Indeed, long after this problem of North Korea, the problem of this illegal holding of nuclear weapons programs by the North Koreans, long after that issue is solved, I strongly believe that there will be a very strong U.S.-Korean relationship. My job is to try to make sure that building on this 50 years, we can build further and make it very strong.

One of the first steps is one going on right now in our security area and that is in the relocation of U.S. forces out of Seoul, out of Yongsan. Also, the announcement that was just made, I guess earlier today or yesterday by the Pentagon, which announced that there has been an agreement between the Korean government and the U.S. government on the redeployment and, really, reconfiguration of 12,500 U.S. troops. That's merely the first step in what will be a reorganization of how we maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula and how our forces really relate to each other. I think making sure that we manage this change correctly and manage this change in a way that there is no change in anyone's perception of our commitment to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is a very important element of what I'm concerned about.

Korea is a country that has achieved a certain global perspective really. That's not surprising when you're one of the largest trading countries in the world. You obviously have interests throughout the world. You have interests in maintaining sea-lanes of communication. You have interests in maintaining free trade throughout the world. So, now we have a growing strategic relationship with Korea. This is best symbolized in the Korean government's decision and the National Assembly's concurrence with the deployment of Korean forces to Iraq. This is a very important step. It represents not only the strength of the Korean-U.S. relationship, but represents as well a growing Korean understanding of its international role and responsibilities and of its desire to safeguard its interests and to be a part in shaping the future in Iraq and in the broader Middle East. So, I think it is a very appropriate thing to do and I think it is also something that is very much in Korean interests to do.

Another area that I'm very much focused on is the area of economics. We have a very strong trading relationship but, frankly, we could be doing more. We have a lot of investment coming two ways now: U.S. investment in Korea, actual Korean investments in the U.S., but again I think we can do more. We should not feel limited by what we've already achieved, but rather we should be inspired by what we've achieved and we should be thinking further.

There are, to be sure, trade issues, problems that come up, trade barriers that we are concerned about. I will be speaking from time to time on these subjects and trying to see if we can, in a very practical way, solve some of the problems that confront us. I recently was speaking with the American Chamber and discussing the need to try to address some of the issues that, in our view, have caused some of our exports not to be as successful as we would like them to be in Korea.

But, I feel that when you do something like this, when you take on tough issues, for example agricultural trade, I think we all have to be very respectful of the deep feelings, the deep emotions, on these issues. We ought to understand that we're going to have to be patient in addressing them. At the same time, it's very important to have an overarching goal, a certain compass so that we know where we're heading toward and that we're not just going from one problem to the next problem, because I can assure you there are problems every day and there will be more problems tomorrow. The issue is not just solving one problem after the other. The issue is looking ahead to what is your goal, what do you want to achieve. So you need a navigational tool here and I think the navigational tool should be a Free Trade Agreement.

I am very mindful of the fact that this is going to take us time. But if we understand that that is the ultimate goal that we're achieving, then we can look at some of these impediments and we can decide that we need to get this out of the road so that we can proceed on this road. When we understand that moving it out of the road is an effort to make progress on that road, I think we can address some of these difficult trade issues.

My third area that I'm very concerned about is to try to make sure that we maintain the very strong people-to-people connections that our two countries have had. This means that we need to address keeping U.S. borders open to Koreans to make sure that Korean students can continue to study as they have. Korean students are very valuable for us in the United States. I speak as someone who is a father of a daughter who is at Wellesley College, and who I'm proud to say is this year at Ewha College. So, I'm trying to make that a two-way street as well. I've met many Korean students at Wellesley College and they're some of the best there. So, we want to make sure that all of that continues.

Ultimately, we would like to see what we can do to make the overall issue of visas much better for Koreans. I don't like to see every day the long lines of people in front of the American Embassy, just a couple of blocks from here. I'd very much like to see what we can do to improve that situation with the long-term hope that we can get to a situation where Korea can join the countries that are already in something called the Visa Waiver Program, meaning that the people who want to be tourists in the U.S. they can just go and be tourists in the U.S. and not have to get a visa in order to be a tourist.

I feel a real sense of responsibility to do what I can on that, but what I need is for Koreans also to take the responsibility to make sure that when they want to go be tourists to the U.S., they really are tourists to the U.S. and they stay within the rules of that status. That is, if you want to go see Disneyland, if you're some kid and you're 23 years old and you want to go visit the U.S. and visit the Grand Canyon and Disneyland, that's wonderful. But, please don't go there and then go try to get a job, because you can't get a job on a tourist visa. We need to make sure that most people who apply for those tourist visas are indeed people who want to be tourists. When we get there, when we get to that situation, we can look forward to trying to get Korea into the status that a number of other countries have achieved, that is the Visa Waiver Program. Again, this is a longer-term goal and it's not going to happen today and it's not going to happen tomorrow. But, in pursuing issues day to day you have to know what your long-term goal is, what you are really trying to achieve.

In conclusion, just to say a little about our strategic relationship, long after this North Korean issue is resolved, one way or the other, I cannot say when, I cannot say how, but it will be resolved, then Korea will still face the issues that it has faced over the centuries. That is, how to maneuver in this space in Northeast Asia and also how to maneuver more broadly; how to secure its interests in the region and the world. As a medium-sized player, it's important for a country like Korea to consider what it needs, what vehicles it needs, in order to maneuver in the region and on the global stage.

There's a certain logic for Korea to having a special U.S. relationship. I think Korea is fortunate in that in this terrible tragedy that took place here in 1950, maybe actually even before, which left the Korean Peninsula divided up until this day, in this terrible, terrible tragedy, there is some value for Korea in that it has forged this special relationship with the United States. I really think that when Koreans think about their interests, they will think about how to pursue those interests. One of the ways they can use to help pursue those interests, those interests in the region, those interests in the world, is to have this special relationship with the U.S.

From our point of view, we need reliable partners. We need friends in the world. We need friends who understand what we are trying to do in the world. We need friends who understand some of the sacrifice that Americans have made in the world. You go to any small American town in the middle of the Midwest or somewhere and you go to a cemetery and you will find some people buried there who died in Korea. This is a very important thing for Americans.

I also understand, and this will be my last point, because I know we want to go to the debate format of this, I also understand that there are changes in Korea. There are generational changes in Korea. So, what for me is logical, what for me derives very logically from the past, is may not be so clear to younger people in Korea. I've got to somehow reach them and understand them. Understand the depth of their feelings. Understand why they're thinking in a certain way, understanding that for me I'm very comfortable on my fact base. I think I've got some good facts, but I've got to be respectful of how people feel and how people may look at some of the same facts that I feel are so strong.

This gets back to the point that I really come here with a very humble sense that there is so much to learn, so much to understand, so many people to see, so many people to hear. I really look forward to using my time in Korea to get around Korea, to meet many different views, not only views here in Seoul, but views elsewhere, in Joella Province and elsewhere. I plan to really try to get around. What I can promise you is a real spirit of openness. I really want to hear your views. I'm not offended by views that differ with mine. I really look forward to doing what I can in my small way to try to build what I feel is one of the greatest relationships in the world.

Thank you very much.

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Question and Answer Session

Question: Thank you very much sir for, first of all, sharing your valuable time with us this morning. We hope to receive answers to many of the questions that we have for you and also receive a lot of information. You were mentioning that you witnessed the June 1987 events from this building and at that time I was in Sejong-ro covering the news. So, I guess we were both at the same place, but we had different perspectives watching the revolt as it unfolded.

You mentioned in your keynote address that, looking at the past 50 years of our bilateral relationship, you have a positive view of what will come in the future. However, unfortunately, many people say that actually bilateral relations are in a poor state. Some are saying that we are witnessing the worst ever situation between our two countries. It seems that both countries are drawing apart from each other.

After you arrived in Korea the second time, during your meeting with National Assemblymen, you had mentioned to them that you were surprised that anti-Korean sentiments among Americans were found not only among the Republicans, the conservatives, but also some Democrats. So, it seems that the situation between our two countries isn't really in a good state. Could you please provide us with your very frank and honest analysis of the status quo of our relationship?

Ambassador Hill: Sure. I have no doubt that there've been a lot of changes in our relationship. I have no doubt that some of these changes have been difficult changes, especially in recent years. I know that there were really some very special circumstances in the last couple of years that caused our relationship to get very, very difficult. There was the tragedy involving the two schoolchildren, especially, that was shocking to many Korean people. Some of these changes and some of the tensions that have been introduced in the U.S.-Korean relationship are a function of the fact that there are changes in how we deal with each other.

Managing change is always a challenge. When you're changing something and you find yourself on new ground and you're not so used to the ground, you seem to stumble. Sometimes you even fall when you're not used to the ground under your feet. So, to some extent we are on this new ground. But, also it's important to recognize that as we've had this transformation in the U.S.-Korean relationship, there are also transformations going on within Korea. There are a lot of profound changes going on in external relations and in internal relations in Korea. Some of the internal changes in Korea have also had some effect on the external relations, notably the relations with the U.S.

I think a lot of this is natural. Just to finish the point, I think too that some of the changes here are just plain generational changes that take place in any country. But in Korea those generational changes have been very important because a certain collective memory has been shifted from an older generation that remembers events very differently from a younger generation. In short, I have no doubt that there have been problems in this relationship but I consider them natural problems, problems that are in some respects inevitable. But I also firmly believe there's a very essential logic to our relationship. A logic for us and very much a logic for Korea as we pursue our interests. I believe that in pursuing these interests, we will find that we have a lot in common and a lot to continue this special relationship.

Finally, and in the future I'll try to keep my answers shorter, you have to avoid a "zero-sum" logic that suggests that, for example, if Korea has a better relationship with its neighbors, it should somehow have a worse relationship with the U.S. I believe that it is absolutely in Korea's interests to maintain good relations with its neighbors. More and better relationships with neighbors does not mean less and worse relations with the U.S. This is absolutely not a zero-sum game.

This reminds me when my mother gave me a blue necktie and a red necktie and when I wore the blue necktie, she said, "What's wrong with the red necktie?" Well, you know, you have to be able to have relations in several areas and I think that's very much in Korean interests. Frankly, we welcome that.

Question: You mentioned during your welcome reception speech that you do not like the ambiguous rhetoric typical of diplomats, but you prefer to give honest and frank answers. So, we hope you will provide us with such answers this morning.

Ambassador Hill: I'm trying. I'm trying. (Laughter)

Question (continued): It seems that recently there has been some fissure between our two countries, in particular in the area of information exchange. I have met some Korean officials who have said that the U.S. seems to be limiting its information sharing with South Korea regarding the North. For example, the Yanggang-do explosion last September. Because the U.S. did not provide timely information, South Koreans had a difficult time analyzing the situation. Could you provide your comments?

Ambassador Hill: I don't want to sound too much like a diplomat, but let me just say, we don't discuss specific intelligence issues. But, generally, and I must say including that incident, we have an excellent, excellent intelligence relationship, and an excellent relationship in sharing. I've worked with a lot of countries, I've never seen a better one.

With respect to that one, our people tried to look at the data and we checked all our sensors and we had to check a lot of things and it took a few days. Sometimes this business is difficult to do. But just because we took a few days to try to verify this doesn't mean the intelligence exchange is bad. It just took a little while. I was the American Ambassador here and I was also waiting for information and I'm not complaining about problems with intelligence exchanges.

I must say, I think the relationship is great. The only thing is, how should I say this? I really don't want a situation where when people have internal problems in Korea, when they like some politician, they don't like some politician, I don't want to really be a part of that. Because it's not my business. It really isn't my business. What I hope we can do is have a situation where the United States and our relationship don't get into the internal situation in Korea.

Question: I think most people, or all people, would agree that the two countries are in a transition in our bilateral relationship. In the past, President Roh Moo-hyun has said that Korea, in its relationship with the U.S., is saying what is on Korea's mind and because of this the U.S. is sometimes surprised. The question is, are you, sir, also surprised at what you are hearing from the Koreans? Secondly, at this crucial moment of change, what do you think is the role that you as U.S. Ambassador should play?

Ambassador Hill: First of all, I'm not going to tell you I'm surprised because Ambassadors are never supposed to be surprised. (Laughter) I will tell you, though, that every day I'm finding I'm learning something new. I'm hearing a point of view that I hadn't heard before. Sometimes I do need to think hard about these points of view, and sometimes they involve a completely different version of the facts and of the circumstances than I'm familiar with. But, even if I don't agree with these different interpretations, I need to respect the fact that other people believe in them. Part of my job is to try to give my side of the story and hope that we can find out where, precisely, we have a problem.

The U.S.-Korean relationship is undergoing transformation. In that process, we are clearly on a different footing, on different ground. We are going to have to keep talking and have to keep trying to resolve some of these issues. The irony of our relationship is that we are two countries separated by the world's biggest ocean and yet we've been kind of living together in a funny way, with such a large U.S. presence here in Korea. So, that gives rise to some of these different interpretations. Again, I'm not worried about them. I'm just trying to understand them well and I'm trying to respond to them well.

Question: We've read press reports that you visited Gwangju on the 16th and the 17th of last month for the opening of the American Corner and on the 16th, you visited the May 18th cemetery there. I think the press dealt with this quite quietly. The report on your visit came out the next day. But we could sense that you showed your deep respect when you visited the cemetery. In a following meeting with the Korean American Association, you mentioned that you visited the National Cemetery to honor and remember the people who fought for democracy. But, some people in Korea are still demanding an apology from the U.S. for the 1980 events that happened in Korea. They point out that this absence of apology is one of the reasons behind anti-American sentiments. Do you feel that the U.S. has some sense of debt towards Korea on this issue?

Ambassador Hill: The issue of Gwangu and May 1980 has been very extensively dealt with in official statements, official analyses, and explanations of what happened. I really can't add to that, to all those official statements. They're there on the record and I stand by them.

I went, really, out of a real sense of the tragedy that took place. These young people, who were very upset with the direction of their country in 1979 and 1980, these people were killed. You have to respect their sacrifice. You have to respect the fact that for many people this remains a deeply emotional, troubling issue. It was just very important for me to go there.

I understand why some people feel that somehow the U.S. did something that wasn't appropriate. All I can say is, I've looked at the facts. I've read these reports. I've read the U.S. government explanations. I completely agree with them. That doesn't change my feelings about the need to go there and to pay respects.

One of the reasons I didn't tell anyone in advance and just did it is that I just wanted an opportunity to go there and be with the victims there. I didn't want it to turn into some big political event. I don't know what more can be said about Gwangju except to say that I understand the depth of feelings about it. I understand that just going there last month is not some historical moment. That this is going to take a long time. But I just wanted the people of Gwangju to know that I really think about them and care about this situation and want to find a way that we can move forward together.

Question: I would like to raise a follow-up question. You mentioned in your keynote address that there seems to have been generational change within South Korea and because of this generational gap, it seems that the older and the younger generations do not share the same collective memories and the younger generation do not remember our bilateral relationship forged during the Korean War. If the Gwangju incident is serving as a stumbling block to Korea's younger generation developing favorable attitudes or views, are you as the U.S. Ambassador willing to take additional steps to try to overcome this barrier?

Ambassador Hill: I am absolutely prepared to do everything I can to overcome the barriers, but I have to be honest with myself at the end of the day. I have an understanding of the historical record that I have to respect. But in terms of trying to understand others and how they come out on this issue, that's also something I want to do. So, what I can promise is a very intensive dialogue where my patience will be endless on this.

I'm trying to remember when I had my Senate hearing whether the lights were as bright as they are today, shining on my face. I don't think they were. I'm afraid I'm going to get a sunburn here.

Question: We were talking earlier about anti-Korean sentiment and anti-American sentiments, but one of the conclusions we can gain from past experiences is that South Koreans are no longer enduring quietly in the relationship with the U.S. In other words, they are frank in expressing their views and they are willing to gather and demonstrate if need be.

Looking at the various events that have occurred: the Highway 56 incident, the Iraq dispatch issue and even the recent President Bush policies towards North Korea, many South Koreans are expressing their views, either for these policies or opposing these policies. We, I believe, have a very realistic problem because we find such expression of views not only in South Korea, but even Americans are expressing their views towards Korea. So, I think these are issues that we must resolve.

My question comes down to this: How do you plan to persuade the South Koreans who are expressing their dislike or protest against the U.S.? How do you plan to persuade the Americans who have similarly negative views towards South Koreans? Do you have a specific plan?

Ambassador Hill: First of all, it's totally natural that South Koreans express their views and it's totally natural that some of those views don't line up identically with ours. This is quite understandable. What I'm interested in building is a relationship based on equality and based on mutual respect. When I say mutual respect that means that you don't have to agree with the other person's views, but you do owe the other person the opportunity to express those views and the right to express those views. That part doesn't trouble me at all.

But it is possible to get in a situation where the way views are expressed gives rise to emotions. First of all, it gives rise to misunderstandings which in turn give rise to a sense of emotion. I would like to do my part to calm that down a little.

Just because a Korean has concerns or is even opposed to the Iraq deployment, in my view it doesn't make that person "anti-American." I need to make sure that anybody who draws the conclusion that that person is anti-American, that I can reach that person and explain that it's not the case. There are lots of Americans who disagree with Iraq. Does that make them anti-American?

At the same time, from the point of view of us, when Koreans express a view that's a more generalized view that somehow America is somehow a danger to the world or something, I have to really respectfully disagree with those views. I owe it to that person to be honest and to make clear that that type of sort-of generalized attack on the U.S., I just don't feel is justified by the circumstances and frankly isn't all that helpful to what we're trying to do.

Generally what we're trying to do is take out a little of the emotion here and try to make people understand that what we need to build this relationship on is not just the history but on the sense of mutual interest, on the sense that we have interests in the world. We have interests in making sure that Iraq is successful. We have interests in making sure the world trading system is successful. We have these mutual interests and that's the basis. To often, some Koreans approach the question of the U.S. relationship as an existential question, that is, "Do you like America? Yes or no?" Whereas, it really should be what are Korean interests? How do we pursue those interests? Should, in pursuing those interests, we pursue a close relationship with the U.S.? I think that's a different way and, in my view, a more efficient way of approaching the issue.

Question: As you know, in Korea we have an "October crisis" theory going around. One of the National Assemblymen had raised this theory during a National Assembly inspection process. There is talk that the U.S. may launch a surgical strike against North Korea. Do you have any specific information on whether there will be a surgical strike?

The October crisis theory is based on two situations. One is a surgical strike by the U.S. The other is North Korea making a move first.

Ambassador Hill: There will not be any October surprise coming from the U.S. except that the Boston Red Sox baseball team is going to win the World Series this year. That's not even a surprise to me.

As for the North Korean leadership, I wish I could understand them better. I spend my whole life trying to understand people and I cannot understand those people.

I'll just add that I hope the North Koreans don't think they understand the American elections, because they don't.

Question: The South Korean government recently released a contingency plan in response to a possible emergency situation in North Korea. According to the plan, it is South Korean officials who will be going to North Korea to calm the situation and govern North Korea. Do you know of this plan and, if you do, do you agree with it? Does the U.S. have a similar contingency plan in an emergency situation in the North?

Ambassador Hill: Sometimes I'm just going to have to say I can't comment on something. I saw that report in your newspapers yesterday, but I have nothing to comment on that.

Question: In your speech to the KIDA on September 24, you mentioned that the Six-Party Talks, the framework may go beyond North Korean issues and become a consultative body for security issues in this region. Can we can take this as U.S. policy or the U.S. stance that the Six-Party Talks is not a temporary framework, but a standing framework for discussion?

Ambassador Hill: No. We do not have a U.S. policy with respect to the question of whether this format would go beyond the immediate purpose for which it is set up. There is no policy on that either yes or no. There is no policy on that.

But, what I was doing was expressing a certain analytical thought, which is that this format, bringing these neighbors together and these countries together that have an interest in Northeast Asia, that they ought to continue to talk and meet and see what can be accomplished. There's a certain logic to the idea of these countries continuing to meet and maybe, and I'm speaking from an analytical point of view, there are not enough of these structures in what is a very busy and very dynamic part of the world.

If you look at the difference in the number of multilateral structures in Europe versus the number of multilateral structures in Northeast Asia, you'll see there's a real deficit in Northeast Asia. So, there is a certain logic to trying to thicken up this institutionalization. But, this is not something that the U.S. government would have a policy toward. We are dealing with a very tough issue right now on North Korea. So, it's a little premature to get into this. But I think people who've visited Europe will see the myriad organizations on top of organizations that deal with these multilateral questions. Then, compare that to Northeast Asia. You'll see there's a difference. It's something that people ought to think about but it's really not on the table as such.

Question: Since we have been asking you a series of very heavy questions, let me give you a lighter one.

Ambassador Hill: Thank you. (Laughter)

Question (continued): Most of the former U.S. Ambassadors after leaving South Korea tend to retire. That is the case we saw with Ambassadors Laney and Bosworth and Hubbard. But, you are relatively younger than our former U.S. Ambassadors. I'm sure that you will have many more opportunities to work for the U.S. government. Some people in Korea think that because we have been given a younger and more active U.S. Ambassador, that denotes a change in the U.S. policy towards South Korea.

So, could you please explain the background for your appointment in this new position?

Ambassador Hill: Thank you very much. I take that as a compliment. I take the question as a compliment.

The background, it's no secret that I really enjoy being in Korea. I like this place. I like a lot of parts of it. Some parts are more difficult than others, but I really enjoy this country. The first thing is, it's true that I "volunteered" for Korea. The only problem with that is that it makes it sound like in a room full of people, I was the only person who put up his hand and said, "Yeah, sure, I'll go." In fact, lots of people wanted to come here, so I was very personally honored that the President and Secretary of State chose me for this position. I was very honored indeed.

Why they chose me for this position, you'd probably ought to ask them rather than me. I like to think that it's because I've had a lot of experience in different parts of the world, not just one part of the world. I've had experience in not only different parts of the world but in very different situations. In places where we've had good relations. In places where the relationship is not so good. It's true that I worked as a special envoy in Kosovo, but I used to have to go up in the mountains and meet with guerilla leaders there and, frankly, that's not experience that I particularly need to use in Korea. Although I would like to get up in the mountains at some point to go hiking.

Again, you have to ask them why they chose me, but I like to think it's because I have a lot of different experiences, that I bring a certain optimism to what I do and frankly I am very excited about working on what I feel is one of our most important bilateral relationships in the world.

Question: This question is on the Kaesong Industrial Complex project, which is proceeding. There is controversy over the strategic technology or materials that should be or should not be allowed inside Kaesong. What are the specific concerns that the U.S. has with regards to these strategic materials? How does it plan to ease such concerns?

Ambassador Hill: I'm not the right person to ask about the very specific details of this. We have some experts who can give you some detailed answers on this. Let me just say though that we have certain export laws and these laws are also in the framework of international agreements on certain technologies. Our concern is to make sure that in pursuing the Kaesong development, we do so in a way that's consistent with our laws and obligations.

I want to stress to you that we absolutely support Korea's efforts in Kaesong. This is a different approach than the approach that we have, but I think it reflects the fact that as we pursue the very difficult problem of North Korea, that we have different roles in how we pursue it. We are very respectful of the fact that you are here and we are on the other side of the world's biggest ocean. That you, therefore, have to pursue these things in a different way. We really respect that.

We really want to see Kaesong succeed. We really do. The problems we have, which as I said are rooted in our legal system, we are working very hard with Korean experts to try to solve. I can assure you that at the end of the day Kaesong will succeed or not succeed not because of export control issues, but because of other issues. That is, we will make sure that these legal problems about technologies are not the issues that cause Kaesong to be a success or not be a success.

We want to see this succeed. It is important to your country. It is an important element of the overall strategy to North Korea. Your politicians, your very senior politicians, have raised this in very senior places in Washington with a full understanding. Kaesong is a tough issue. I always admire people who take on tough issues. That's what your government is doing right now.

Question: We have three questions from the floor. First, since we are talking about an FTA, when do you think an FTA will be concluded? Is there a specific timeline?

Second question is on the U.S.'s North Korean Human Rights Act. Do you think this act will affect the Six-Party Talks? What about comments that this may be part of anti-North Korean policy within the U.S.?

The third question is on the discussion between bilateral versus multilateral approaches to North Korea during the first presidential debates in the U.S. Candidate Kerry had been asked about his view on the bilateral approach as well as the role of China. So, can you share what you know about this?

Ambassador Hill: First of all, with respect to the Free Trade Agreement, it is much too premature to talk about any timelines on this. We need to focus on clearing away the impediments to achieving even the start of any kind of negotiations on this. We continue to have a lot of impediments and disputes that need to be resolved.

My point in raising the Free Trade Agreement is that people who make sacrifices in resolving trade impediments need to see those sacrifices, need to understand that the purpose of doing it, is to achieve a bigger goal and that bigger goal should be the FTA. So, we're not there yet in terms of any kind of timeframe, but what I can assure you is that I'm going to work very hard on this and I know that there are some people in Washington who agree with me on this. We will see what can be achieved. In the meantime, we've got to deal with these problems that are blocking the way.

With respect to the North Korean Human Rights Act, I don't believe this should have an effect on the negotiations on the nuclear weapons programs. Now, I know that there are many people in Korea who feel that this is somehow not practical and not convenient to have these expressions of concern about North Korean human rights. People do need to bear in mind that human rights is an issue that is a matter of international concern. This is not a peninsula issue. This is not a concern just of the North Korean authorities. It's a matter of international concern. There are certain international standards. I think everyone understands that countries don't achieve standards overnight. They don't. My country certainly did not achieve standards overnight and, frankly, we have to work on our human rights record every day of the year, as does every country.

But, it's important for the North Korean leadership to understand that this is a subject of international responsibility, not to speak of moral responsibility. When these things come up, people need to understand that it is quite natural not only in the U.S. Congress, but I'm sure in other parts of the world. I would not be surprised if we didn't see things like this coming out of the European parliament. I would not be surprised if these things came out of other areas as well. These are very important and very heartfelt concerns. If the North Korean regime is thinking about being a member of the international community, and I hope they are for their sake, for the sake of their people, I hope they are considering membership in the international community. They can't ignore human rights. It's just something that they have to understand is part of the ticket.

Finally, with respect to the issue that came up so prominently actually in the debate between Senator Kerry and President Bush, as the American Ambassador here, I don't want to tell you to ignore the American presidential election campaign. I should not tell you to ignore it. But, I would suggest that you keep in mind that we have a very intense political process back there.

It's always very difficult to understand someone else's politics. It's hard enough to understand your own. Understand that it's a very intense political time there. What you have to keep in mind, and certainly I'd hope the North Korean regime would try to keep this in mind, is that there is no tolerance, among Democrats or among Republicans, for North Korea retaining nuclear weapons programs. There is no tolerance at all for that.

And how a Kerry administration would handle this problem versus a Bush administration, all I can do is assure you there is a great belief that this is not just a U.S. problem, this is everyone's problem. Other countries should be directly involved, hence the Six-Party Talks, but overall we need to be as vigorous as possible, using as many avenues as possible, to finding a solution. There is really a consensus on that.

Moderator: We apologize. We have a few more questions from the floor, but because our panelists have a few more questions, we will receive the questions from the panelists.

Question: I believe that it was yesterday that the Russian Ambassador in China said that the Korean Peninsula is facing the most difficult situation ever. South Koreans know what this means because the situation now is very sensitive, with relations with the different major powers surrounding the peninsula. This is why I had asked about contingencies for an emergency situation, if there is such a thing. But, because there are so many countries involved, the perspectives and the approach is naturally very different. So, I would like to ask, as the U.S. Ambassador, is there a certain principle which you follow in trying to resolve these situations?

Ambassador Hill: Resolve the situation of tensions on the peninsula, is that it?

Question (continued): Different countries have different interests in what may happen on the peninsula, including a sudden change in the situation in North Korea. As U.S. Ambassador, you may have received some training or some information about how to deal with the changes on the Korean Peninsula. Could you share those?

Ambassador Hill: What I can say is, first of all, we have a multilateral format for dealing with the North Korean problem and there's a reason for that. It's because all countries share an interest in eliminating these nuclear weapons programs and in insuring stability on the peninsula more specifically. I don't think there's any disagreement on those essential issues.

Clearly, countries have different approaches to how they feel these issues can be addressed. I think what the Six-Party process does is provide enough flexibility for those approaches, but also provides a forum by which we can coordinate the approaches. I explained earlier, the U.S. does not have the Kaesong approach, but the Republic of Korea does. It's just that we have some different roles in how we approach this.

What's important about this multilateral process is not to give the North Koreans the impression that they can begin to be selectively shopping for various initiatives and to cause us to start negotiating with each other instead of negotiating with themselves. That's why from my professional experience, the first thing we need to do is to be in close contact with each other, know what we're doing, know why we're doing it, and make sure the North Koreans understand there is no daylight between us on these things.

Moderator: That ends the Q&A. We will now present you with a souvenir plaque. We appreciate your support for the Kwanhun Club and especially your participation in the 128th Kwanhun Forum. Your speech entitled "Changes in U.S.-ROK Relations" has enriched our members greatly. We are grateful for the invaluable insights and experiences you have shared with us. You words have encouraged us to continue in our pursuit of professional excellence.

Ambassador Hill: Thank you very much for this opportunity to meet with you all. For those who still have a question and we weren't able to get to it, I'll be here for a few years. (Laughter)