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Security Relations

U.S. Seeks to "Strengthen and Rebalance" Forces in Korea, Japan

27 September 2004

New threats require new military posture, Admiral Fargo Says

The United States is seeking to strengthen and rebalance its security relationships with Japan and South Korea in order to better meet new security challenges, says Admiral Thomas B. Fargo.

Fargo, the commander of all U.S. forces in the Pacific, told the Senate Armed Services Committee September 23 that cyber, biological and terrorist threats have been added to "more traditional concerns" such as the security of the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. Adding to the complexity of security challenges, he said, are weapons proliferation and trafficking in humans and illicit drugs.

To meet these challenges, Fargo said, the U.S. Pacific Command is strengthening command and control, increasing capabilities for immediate employment, improving force posture and diversifying access and enroute logistics.

The United States is working closely with Japan to reduce the overall number of U.S. troops there and address long-standing noise and encroachment concerns while "assuring an enduring presence of critical forward forces and warfighting capability," Fargo said.

In South Korea, the United States is consolidating its military presence into two hubs south of the Han River, a move the admiral said is calculated to improve capabilities "to enhance power projection, readiness, and deterrence both on the Peninsula and regionally." He added that the United States will redeploy troops from South Korea "as combined forces are modernized and the Republic of Korea assumes a greater role in its own defense."

At the same time, the United States is deploying rotational bomber elements to Guam and stationing submarines there, Fargo said.

The United States continues to look for "access and logistic prepositioning opportunities" throughout the Pacific theater to enable its forces to move quickly to where they are needed most, he said.

Following is the text of Fargo's remarks, as provided by the U.S. Pacific Command:

(begin text)

Admiral Thomas B. Fargo
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command
Before the Senate Armed Services Committee
United States Senate
Regarding the Defense Global Posture Review
23 September 2004

ADM FARGO: Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and distinguished members of the Committee,

Thank you for this opportunity to address U.S. Pacific Command planning to strengthen our global and theater defense posture. Let me add first my thanks for your outstanding support of our men and women in the Armed Forces.

Two and a half years ago, I testified before this committee on our priorities for the Pacific Command. Two of these -- "reinforcing the constants in Asia-Pacific security" and "promoting the change necessary for improving our defense posture" -- are key to our larger Global strategy.

Together, these priorities reinforce the foundation of regional stability - our long-standing bilateral alliances, our friendships both old and new, and the presence of our forward-deployed combat forces - while optimizing capabilities of Pacific Command to tackle the challenges of the evolving security environment. The new threat context demands profound and enduring improvements in the way we command, equip, employ, and station our forces.

Strengthening and rebalancing our security relationships with Japan and South Korea is vital to stability in Northeast Asia. Each is working closely with us to secure peace and effect enduring solutions to mutual challenges associated with basing our forces, while maintaining a strong deterrence posture.

Our other Asian treaty allies -- Australia, Thailand, Philippines, along with good friends such as Singapore, Malaysia, India, Indonesia, Mongolia, and many others have also worked side-by-side with us to advance efforts in the War on Terror.

During my service in the Pacific over the past five years the pace of change has been stunning, certainly since the end of the Cold War, and also since 9/11. Globalization has added a dimension of speed to nearly every aspect of life. Crises clearly affect more people, faster.

Cyber, biological, and terrorist threats are present along with more traditional concerns like the Korean Peninsula, the potential for miscalculation across the Taiwan Strait or in Kashmir, and a host of transnational threats. I mentioned terrorism but there is also proliferation and the trafficking in humans and drugs. We require a changed approach to meet these complex security challenges.

In Asia and the Pacific, vibrant economies, burgeoning populations, maturing democracies, and military modernization only serve to add momentum to regional transformation and increase the need for new security strategies.

OPERATIONALIZING THE STRATEGY

In response to this changing environment, Pacific Command undertook efforts -- with the direction of the Secretary and Chairman -- to "operationalize" our National Security Strategy in the Pacific Command's area of responsibility and in support of other combatant commands worldwide.

For U.S. Pacific Command, those efforts include: updating plans, strengthening command and control, increasing capabilities for immediate employment, creating new operating patterns and concepts, improving force posture, and diversifying access and enroute logistics.

Forward and Expeditionary ground, sea and air forces have enhanced our ability to immediately employ tailored power on short notice and in new ways. For example, we are:

-- collocating Stryker with high-speed vessels and C-17 airlift in Hawaii and Alaska

-- deploying rotational bomber elements to Guam

-- stationing submarines in Guam

-- and we have proposed homeporting an additional Carrier Strike Group forward in the Pacific.

Optimizing these immediately employable forces requires an appropriate footprint with more reachback, less infrastructure, and less burden on hosts. For instance, as part of the Defense Policy Review Initiative, we are working closely with our ally Japan to reduce the overall number of United States troops there, remove long-standing noise and encroachment concerns, and adjust force posture in Okinawa. As part of this process we will mature and strengthen the US-Japan security alliance while assuring an enduring presence of critical forward forces and warfighting capability.

In the Future of the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance initiative, we are consolidating our footprint into two enduring hubs south of the Han River which leverages improved capabilities to enhance power projection, readiness, and deterrence both on the Peninsula and regionally. The United States will also redeploy troops from South Korea as combined forces are modernized and the Republic of Korea assumes a greater role in its own defense.

Finally, we're looking for access and logistic prepositioning opportunities throughout the theater that allow us to move forces quickly to the location of greatest need. A network of Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs), places not bases, will provide avenues of critical access for contingency operations, expand Special Operations Forces presence, and continue, through our security cooperation efforts, to strengthen the capacity of our allies and partners in the region.

CONCLUSION

I am proud to represent the men and women of U.S. Pacific Command who work tirelessly on behalf of our nation to put in place credible, flexible, and ready forces to secure our national interests at home and abroad. I thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I look forward to your questions.

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